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"The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who
Fear Their Influence on State Objects"*: The
Failure to Abolish Supreme Court
Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts
of 1792 and 1793
WYTHE HoLT**
T HE Judiciary Act of 17891 (Judiciary Act or Act) established the
new national court system upon a workable basis.2 While later gen-
*The quotation is taken from a letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793), reprinted
in 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 509 (C. King ed. 1894-1900).
Spelling and capitalization in quotations from documents written in the 1780s, 1790s, and 1800s
have been left in their original style, where it could be deciphered from sometimes murky
manuscripts. Punctuation has been modernized, largely because there are no modem equivalents for
some of the punctuation marks in use at that time.
** University Research Professor of Law, University of Alabama. B.A., 1963, Amherst Col-
lege; J.D., 1966, Ph.D., 1979, University of Virginia. The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Dean Charles Gamble and the University of Alabama School of Law for continuing financial sup-
port of the project of which this essay forms a part; collegial suggestions made by Professors
Kathryn Preyer and William Casto have improved this essay immensely; and the support given by
Professor Mary K. Tachau has been important. Many of the documents used for this essay were
collected, transcribed, and annotated by the staff of the Documentary History of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 1789-1800, and will be published in the forthcoming Volume 2 of that series,
from Columbia University Press. The conclusions and opinions in this essay are those of the author
and not of the Documentary History Project or of any of his colleagues previously mentioned.
This essay is dedicated to the memory of Charles Warren, the most important historian of the
early federal judiciary, whose scholarship is much more durable than critics generally give him
credit for.
1. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) [herein-
after Judiciary Act of 1789]. Today, usage demands that important statutes allocating federal juris-
diction be called "Judiciary Acts." While the 1789 Act has come to be known as "the Judiciary Act
of 1789," Congress did not utilize that term in the early period, nor, apparently, was it a term of
common parlance then. Moreover, there is no agreement on which acts are sufficiently important to
deserve the appellation. I will use the term "Judiciary Act" to refer to each major piece of legislation
by Congress dealing with the structure, requirements, privileges, or jurisdiction of the federal courts.
2. Standard works on the federal judicial system, 1789-1794, which deal with circuit-riding,
relevant federal jurisprudence, and the legislative changes dealt with in this Article, include F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4-23 (1928); J. GOEBEL, THE HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 542, 545-50, 553-60
(197 1); C. WARREN, I THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 6-14, 57-77, 85-104 (rev.
ed. 1926); Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 127; Turner,
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erations praised it as "probably the most important and the most satis-
factory act ever passed by Congress," 3 and although it "devised a judicial
organization which, with all its imperfections, served the country sub-
stantially unchanged for nearly a century,"4 there were "imperfections,"
and opinions were not nearly so adulatory in 1789 or immediately
thereafter.
To begin with, the Act was unusually intricate and complex. It was
the product of much compromise between its principal drafters, specifi-
cally, between those who desired a strong central government, and others
who feared the power of a strong central government and who focused
much of their attention on the dangers apparently posed by the potent
judiciary authorized by the new Constitution.5 Compromises produced
Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 4-7 (1965); C. Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); K. Turner,
The Judiciary Act of 1801, at 22-55, 62-63 (1959) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Wisconsin). I have greatly profited from being able to get prepublication looks at Marcus & Van
Tassel, "A Mear Matter of Bargain" Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800,
in CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL RELATIONS: A PRELIMINARY COLLOQUIUM (R. Katzman ed.
1987) (citations hereinafter are to the manuscript version) and W. RiTz, REWRITING THE HISTORY
OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW
EVIDENCE (forthcoming from Oklahoma University Press, 1989).
The present Article differs from most previous accounts in four significant ways. First, I have had
access to more primary materials, so that I have been able to present a more detailed account and, in
some instances, to correct errors of detail. Most of these corrections are de minimis and none are
specifically noted herein, but may be ascertained by comparing this essay with the cited previous
treatments. Second, this Article depicts more disagreement and disjunction among the justices in the
early 1790s, over the circuit-riding issues in particular, than has heretofore been commonly por-
trayed. Third, the way in which circuit-riding interlocked with the other provisions of, and the
policy goals sought by, the Judiciary Act of 1789 has not been emphasized in previous accounts,
Fourth, and most important, previous authors have not dwelled on the fact that many Federalists
joined Anti-Federalists in desiring changes in the Judiciary Act from the beginning-though, of
course, Federalists advocated very different changes from those wanted by Anti-Federalists, and
Federalists were by no means agreed on the changes that were desirable. For many Federalists, the
termination of circuit duty formed only a part of the alterations they wanted. The fears of costliness
and national centralization that such desires provoked, joined with the difficulty of extracting cir-
cuit-riding from its web of connections in the provisions and policy of the Judiciary Act, helped to
freeze the status quo. It has not previously been emphasized that the stirring of the waters of the
federalism debate (over the powers of the federal government vis-a-vis the states) provoked by the
conflicting desires of those who wanted judicial reform (and fueled by several actions of the justices)
was one of the chief reasons that destroyed the chances for an early general relief from circuit-riding.
Cf J. GOEBEL, supra, at 568 (federalism debate not mentioned in the catalog of reasons for the
failure of Congress to "ease the lot of the Justices").
3. Brown, The New Federal Judicial Code, 36 REP. A.B.A. 339, 345 (1911).
4. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Anonymous Essay Published Under the Pseudonym of "Brutus," [hereinafter Brutus Essay]
N.Y. JOUR., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 2.9.1, 2.9.7 (H.
Storing ed. 1981); Brutus Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra, at 2.9.130-2.9.144; Brutus Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 2
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complexity and conflicts. Further, the Constitution had drastically reor-
ganized the United States to establish a government and, especially, a
judiciary that were novel in many ways. This required concomitant nov-
elty and experimentation in judicial structure and practice as well. Con-
trary to the example of broad and open frameworks set by the
Constitution, the authors of the Act opted for a great amount of specific-
ity and detail, which proved confusing to many. Additional problems
resulted from the pressure to keep to a minimum the costs of the new
government, and still more complexity resulted from the attempt of the
Act's drafters to adapt a single national court system to the varying pro-
cedures and judicial practices of the eleven states that formed the union
in 1789.
Criticism of the intricacy, the cost, and the jurisdictional potency of
the Judiciary Act was widespread, even among supporters of the new
Constitution. Lawyer and philosopher John Dickinson, in frustration,
called it "the most difficult to be understood of any legislative bill I have
ever read."6 James Madison found it "pregnant with difficulties, not only
as relating to a part of the constitution which has been most criticised,
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, surpta, at 11 2.9.145-2.9.158; Brutus Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Feb.
21, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, surpa, at I 2.9.159-2.9.167; Brutus
Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Feb. 28, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 1
2.9.168-2.9.175; Brutus Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Mar. 6, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra, at $% 2.9.176-2.9.185; Brutus Essay, N.Y. JOUR., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at $% 2.9.186-2.9.196; Anonymous Letter Published in
Pamphlet Form Under the Pseudonym "The Federal Farmer" [hereinafter Federal Farmer] (Oct. 8,
1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 11 2.8.15, 2.8.16; Federal Farmer
(Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at II 2.8.24, 2.8.41-2.8.45;
Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at II
2.8.183-2.8.195. See also F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 2, at 8-11; C. WARREN, supra
note 2, at 7 ("rnhe... Article [of the Constitution] relating to the Judicial branch of the new
Government had been [during the ratifications debates] the subject of more severe criticism and of
greater apprehensions than any other portion of the instrument.").
6. Letter from John Dickinson to George Read (June 24, 1789), reprinted in THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE READ 481-482 (W. Read ed. 1870). One future United States Attor-
ney General wrote: "This bill & the examination I have given it tho' but slight shows me in a strong
light, the difficulty of legislating for so great a country, consisting of such discordant materials."
Letter from William Bradford to Elias Boudinot (June 28, 1789) (Wallace Papers, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania). Another future Attorney General thought that: "The minute detail ought to be
consigned to the judges. Every attempt towards it must be imperfect, and being so may become a
topic of ridicule to technical men." Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30,
1789), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 273 (W. Hutchinson et aL eds. 1962) [here-
inafter MADISON PAPERS]. All were commenting upon the bill that passed the Senate, but no major
alterations were made during its passage by the House.
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but being in its own nature peculiarly complicated and embarrassing."7
William R. Davie, later a Federalist governor of North Carolina and a
federal commissioner to France, concluded: "[I]t is so defective in point
of arrangement, and so obscurely drawn or expressed, that, in my opin-
ion, it would disgrace the composition of the meanest legislature of the
States." 8 An "old man" writing to a Boston newspaper echoed the senti-
ments of many when he complained bitterly about the "enormous sti-
pends and salaries" of federal officials, particularly the judges, and
wanted "all this unwieldy and useless machinery of Circuit, District and
Supreme Courts" abolished in favor of letting state courts handle the
business, checked only "by giving a Court of the Union power to ex-
amine and correct those cases where foreigners or persons of different
States are concerned." 9
While a few who were opposed to the new government predicted
that the complexity of the judiciary would "in the end procure it's de-
struction,"1 and others wisely foresaw that the judicial establishment
would be among the measures "fallen upon that.., will be difficult [for
Congress later] to recede from,""1 many, from all groupings of political
thought, understood the Act to be an experimental first try, with suitable
amendments soon to follow. Arthur Lee, an opponent of the Constitu-
tion, concluded with surprising equanimity that "it is difficult to say how
[the Judiciary Act] coud. have been framed less exceptionable. We must
try some experiments & try them with temper."1 2 Madison hoped that
the "defective... system may speedily undergo a reconsideration under
7. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (July 31, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 6, at 317.
8. Letter from William Richardson Davie to James Iredell (Aug. 2, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 335 (G. McRee ed. 1857-58) [hereinafter LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL].
9. Rusticus, Independent Chronicle, Aug. 26, 1790 (Boston newspaper). Another supporter of
the national government was upset that a Congress composed chiefly of lawyers had neglected the
woes of commerce, navigation, fisheries, and manufacturing (attention to which, the writer claimed,
had been promised to the people at the Massachusetts ratification convention to be Congress's first
order of business), in order to supply "an inexhaustible source of business for themselves" by "adopt-
ing an extensive, expensive, perplexing, and distressing" judiciary that would eventually "swallow up
the State courts" and overturn trial by jury. Federal Government, Independent Chronicle, Sept. 13,
1790 (Boston newspaper).
10. Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789) (Patrick Henry Papers,
Library of Congress).
11. Letter from John Sullivan to John Langdon (Aug. 18, 1789) (Langdon/Elwyn Family Pa-
pers, New Hampshire Historical Society). See also letter from James Monroe to James Madison
(Aug.12, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 6, at 331.
12. Letter from Arthur Lee to Tench Coxe (Aug. 4, 1789) (Tench Coxe Papers, Historical Soci-
ety of Pennsylvania).
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the auspices of the Judges who alone will be able perhaps to set it to
rights."13 And John Jay, proponent of a strong central government,
remembered later the view he had taken in 1789: "Expectations were...
entertained that [the Act] would be amended, as the public mind became
more composed and better informed." 4 At the end of its second session
in August of 1790, the House of Representatives confirmed the notion
that the Judiciary Act was experimental when it required Attorney Gen-
eral Edmund Randolph to study the judicial system and to report
changes that he thought necessary. 5
Difficulties of various sorts did indeed present themselves almost im-
mediately. For the justices, the most pressing problem was the require-
ment that they ride on circuit. The Judiciary Act instituted a Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, as the Constitution required, and cre-
ated a set of district courts for the trial of admiralty cases and petty
crimes. In between, however, to the surprise of most Americans, a mid-
dle level consisting of three circuit courts was established. 6 Though the
circuit courts heard appeals in some instances from the district courts,
13. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept.14, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 6, at 402; letter from Edward Carrington to Henry Knox (Oct. 25, 1789) (Henry
Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society)("The Judiciary System is so defective that it will
doubtless undergo much alteration in the next session of Congress."); letter from John Jay to Ed-
mund Rutledge (Nov. 16, 1789) (extract of letter quoted in advertisement for sale of letter in
Rendell's Inc. catalog) ("Our judicial system is not free from difficulties, and I think the judges will
often find themselves embarrassed.").
14. Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Jan. 2, 1801), reprinted in I THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1800, at 146 (M. Marcus & J.
Perry eds. 1985) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The petition the justices
submitted to Congress on August 9, 1792, also reflected this sentiment. They recalled "[t]hat when
the present Judicial arrangements took place, it appeared to be a general and well founded opinion,
that the Act then passed was to be considered rather as introducing a temporary expedient, than a
permanent system, and that it would be revised as soon as a period of greater leisure should arrive."
Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and Thomas John-
son to George Washington (Aug. 9, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANE-
OUS 51 (W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds. 1834).
15. H.R. Res., 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 5, 1790), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1789-1791, at 550 (L. De
Pauw, C. Bickford & L. Hauptman eds. 1977) [hereinafter FIRST CONGRESS DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY]. For commentary on the Attorney General's task and report, see the companion essay in this
issue, Holt, "Federal Courts as the Asylum to Federal Interests'" Randolph's Report, the Benson
Amendment, and the "Original Understanding" of the Federal Judiciary.
16. Most people in 1789 expected the establishment of only a Supreme Court and a few federal
admiralty courts--not the highly articulated and well-staffed system that Senator Oliver Ellsworth
doggedly and successfully advocated. Felix Frankfurter, noting, in 1928, the absence of such judicial
articulation in all other systems of federal government in the world, called "the establishment for
this country of the tradition of a system of inferior federal courts.. . the transcendent achievement
of the First Judiciary Act." F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 2, at 4.
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their chief function was to sit twice a year in each state as the primary
federal trial courts for those non-admiralty cases that were not confined
to the Supreme Court by the Constitution and that were most likely to be
troublesome or important. These included cases founded upon the di-
verse state citizenship of the parties or upon the foreign citizenship of one
of the parties, and also included cases removed from state courts involv-
ing citizens of the same state but dealing with land claimed under grants
from two or more states, and cases presenting important federal criminal
and civil litigation brought by the United States. 7 The Act did not staff
the circuit courts with their own judges, but rather, each circuit court
was to be composed of two of the six Supreme Court justices plus the
district judge resident in the state (or district) where the court sat. Each
of the six members of the Supreme Court would thus be required, twice a
year, to travel through one of the three circuits.
"Circuit-riding" was established for several important reasons. First
were the cost factors. Only two sets of national judges were created, so
salaries for a separate set of circuit judges did not have to burgeon what
many perceived to be an already bloated federal payroll. Moreover, giv-
ing litigants two Supreme Court justices at the trial of their cases would
heighten the gravity, the legitimacy, and the finality of those trials, les-
sening the litigants' need to take appeals to a distant Supreme Court,
which would have been prohibitively expensive for most people. Thus,
the system of having Supreme Court justices riding circuit saved money
both for the government and for litigants-concerns that were important
to Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike. 18
Second, it was imperative that authoritative and correct answers be
17. Cases "arising under" the Constitution or federal laws were also predicted to be trouble-
some, but it was a part of the great compromise effected in the Judiciary Act of 1789 between the
Ellsworth-led Federalists and the Anti-Federalists in the person of Senator Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia that such cases would be originally cognizable solely in state courts, with entry into the
federal system only after a final decision by the states. On this point, see Holt, supra note 15, at 365.
18. One of the principal arguments that had been made by Anti-Federalists against the judiciary
in the new Constitution was the expense of litigating in distant federal courts, particularly in a
Supreme Court located at the seat of government. See, e.g., Federal Farmer (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 5, at 2.8.16; 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEV-
ERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Q. Elliot ed.
1836) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (remarks of McDowall on the
floor of the first North Carolina ratification convention). They were also extremely concerned about
the expense of a large federal judiciary. See, e.g., id. at 136 (remarks of Spencer on the floor of the
first North Carolina ratification convention); Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Leg-
islature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at
Philadelphia, [hereinafter Genuine Information], reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 5, at 2.4.58. Important Federalists shared these concerns. See, e.g., letter from David
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given to the crucial and divisive legal questions that it was expected
would soon come before the federal courts. Circuit-riding would involve
the justices of the high court directly at the trial of most of the earliest
federal cases. Legitimacy was thus an important concern in this regard
too.
Third, circuit-riding "ke[pt] the Federal Judiciary in touch with the
local communities,"1 9 so that the justices could lecture the people
through grand-jury charges widely reprinted in the newspapers on the
ways that the new government served their needs. In Ralph Lerner's apt
phrase, the circuit courts would act as "republican schoolmasters."2 The
justices' speeches would inculcate the awe and the respect that the Feder-
alist Founders believed to be necessary for support of a conservative new
government not understood by or popular with remote or lower-class
segments of the American population. They could explain why popular
restraint, deference, and submission to the good independent judgment of
their elected representatives were more mannerly and appropriate to peo-
Sewall to George Thatcher (Apr. 11, 1789) (Chamberlain Collection, Boston Public Library, by
courtesy of the Trustees) [hereinafter Chamberlin Collection]; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
The Act's principal drafters explained that the circuit provisions had been written to answer such
concerns. Senator William Paterson defended the circuit system, at the time the Senate debated the
proposed judiciary bill in June 1789, in part on grounds that it would "meet every Citizen in his own
State, not drag him 800 miles upon an appeal." Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of its
Authority Over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1101, 1129 (1985). Paterson thought
that "not many appeals" to the Supreme Court would be taken, if citizens with federal issues had a
trial in a federal circuit court before Supreme Court judges. The alternative, according to Paterson,
allowing state courts to serve as the lower federal courts, would have been "monstrous" because it
would be "expensive and oppressive" to require litigants to appeal and travel to a distant Supreme
Court in order to have federal judges hear their federal issues. Id. at 1135. Paterson's notes for and
draft of his important speech of June 23, 1789, are conveniently set out in the appendices to Casto's
article. Id. at 1129-35.
The chief drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Senator Oliver Ellsworth, echoed Paterson in
explaining the bill to his Connecticut friend Richard Law-who was soon to be appointed the first
federal district court judge in Connecticut. The proposed circuit courts, staffed with Supreme Court
and district judges "with out ... much enhancing the expence," would "settle many cases in the
States that would otherwise go to the Supreme Court," Ellsworth wrote. Letter from Oliver Ells-
worth to Richard Law (Aug. 4, 1789) (Ernst Law Papers, Connecticut Historical Society). "Without
this arrangement there must be many appeals or writs of error from the supreme courts of the
States." Id. Ellsworth "question[ed] much if any [alternative] will be found at once more economi-
cal, systematic & efficient than the one under consideration." Id. Another Connecticut friend wrote
Ellsworth that the bill rendered federal litigation "as little burdensome and expensive as circum-
stances will admit." Letter from Oliver Wolcott Sr. to Oliver Ellsworth (June 27, 1789) (Wolcott
Papers, Connecticut Historical Society) (emphasis in original).
19. C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 58.
20. See Lerner, supra note 2. I am indebted to Kathryn Preyer for bringing this important essay
to my attention. See also Newmeyer, Justice Joseph Story on Circuit and a Neglected Phase of Ameri-
can Legal History, 14 Am. J. L. HIsT. 112, 114-15, 124-25, 132-35 (1970).
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ple in a democratic republic than the exuberant self-governance of the
crowd exemplified by rural and urban crowd action throughout the colo-
nial and the revolutionary eras, and most recently and frighteningly ex-
hibited by Shays' Rebellion in west-central New England and by
separatist movements in Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, and else-
where.2 Also, the presence of these justices would provide an active and
visible cement to attach the loyalties of the people to a novel central gov-
ernment, diluting somewhat their previous sole allegiance to their state
governments.22
And lastly, circuit-riding by the highest judges would enhance the
uniformity of federal law, another end much desired by the Federalists. 23
Circuit-riding was arduous, however. Travel through the Eastern
Circuit, consisting of New York and the New England States, was fatigu-
ing enough, while the large Middle Circuit (New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia) was strenuous but not as bad as it
might have been, since judicial travel was entailed only from court city to
nearby court city (the only such city not in the populated seaboard area
was Charlottesville, the alternative site in Virginia, abandoned as a court
site in 1791). Reasonable traveling accommodations were usually avail-
able in both of these circuits. By contrast, the Southern Circuit required
long trips through often rough, unpopulated, and even unknown terrain,
sometimes in unpredictably nasty weather, with accommodations uncer-
tain and often unpleasant. 4 Given the required two trips on circuit plus
two sessions per year of the Supreme Court at the seat of government, no
21. See E. COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1985); E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1976); P. GIUIE, THE ROAD TO MOBOCRACY: POPULAR DISORDER IN
NEW YORK CITY, 1763-1834, at 3-78 (1987); D. HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY
MASSACHUSETTS, 1765-1790 (1977); G. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLIT-
ICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1979); T. SLAUGHTER,
THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986); D.
SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980); Karsky,
Agrarian Radicalism in the Late Revolutionary Period (1780-1795), in NEW WINE IN OLD SKINS: A
COMPARATIVE VIEW OF SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND VALUES AFFECTING THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 87-114 (E. Angerman, M. Frings & H. Wellenreuther eds. 1976).
22. "Your Circuit thro the several Districts ... will be productive of many good Consequences
both public and private .... The Appearance of your Court also carrying Home to every Mans
Bosom a Conviction of the Authority delegated to the General Government and of the prudent
Manner in which that Authority will be used will go very far towards the firm Establishment of it.
For that you know depends always on opinion." Letter from Gouverneur Morris to John Jay (Sept.
7, 1790) (Gouverneur Morris Papers, Library of Congress).
23. Paterson's notes and the Ellsworth and Wolcott letters, supra note 18, make this clear.
24. When George Washington was inaugurated President in April 1789, eleven states made up
the union; North Carolina and Rhode Island had failed to ratify. Although 'North Carolina ratified
in late 1789, it was integrated into the federal court system as a part of the Southern Circuit only in
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justice could spend much time at home with family, on business, or in the
study of the law. Circuit-riding was difficult for healthy men in their
prime, while several of the justices were infirm or aging.
Complaints soon emanated from most of President Washington's
appointees to the Supreme Court. The eldest member, Justice William
Cushing of Massachusetts, reported in 1793 that he "had been obliged
... to be absent from home in my last Excursion on Judicial duty, above
fourteen months, save only four weeks."2 Cushing once agreed to substi-
tute for Justice John Blair of Virginia at a Pennsylvania Circuit Court to
prevent Blair's having to travel 1,500 miles to hold a single court.26 Jus-
tice James Iredell of North Carolina complained to his wife on his first
circuit tour of the Southern Circuit that "I scarcely thought there had
been so much barren land in all America as I have passed through,"27
and later noted that he had had to take "the Southern Circuit three times
out of four & upon the last Circuit alone rode over 1800 miles, at least
1000 more than the utmost route of the others."28 On another Southern
Circuit assignment Iredell "was prevented [from] reaching Savannah by
one of the greatest floods of rain ever known in this State ... all the
bridges almost being broke up in every direction .... I made every effort
June 1790. When they joined the union, Rhode Island (in 1790) and Vermont (in 1791) became parts
of the Eastern Circuit.
The circuit court system remained incomplete, outlying regions being treated in a somewhat hap-
hazard manner. Maine, which remained a part of Massachusetts until 1820, nevertheless had a sepa-
rate federal district court with appellate jurisdiction lodged in the Eastern Circuit. Kentucky, a part
of Virginia until its admission to statehood in 1792, had its own district court as well. But Kentucky,
Tennessee (judicially a part of North Carolina until its admission to statehood in 1796), and the
territory northwest of the Ohio River (given congressionally created trial courts whose judges did
not have lifetime tenure) did not become a part of the circuit court system until passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1801. The territory south of Tennessee had non-life-tenured trial judges, but was
not integrated into the circuit system even under the 1801 Act. The Judiciary Act gave the district
judges in Maine and Kentucky (and after 1796, in Tennessee) the powers of circuit judges, and
appeals from the Kentucky and Tennessee district courts were to be taken directly to the Supreme
Court.
Had circuit-riding by the Supreme Court justices been extended into these regions by the Judici-
ary Act, the difficulties of that task would have increased tenfold.
25. Letter from William Cushing to William Paterson (Mar. 5, 1793) (Robert Treat Paine Pa-
pers, Massachusetts Historical Society) [hereinafter Paine Papers].
26. Id. There is no record that Cushing actually performed this service, though it could have
happened in October 1790, since we do not know which justice(s) held that Pennsylvania Circuit.
27. Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 10, 1790), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES
IREDELL, supra note 8, at 288.
28. Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792) (Thomas Johnson Papers, C.
Burr Artz Public Library, Frederick, Maryland) [hereinafter Thomas Johnson Papers].
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in my power, and was nearly drowned in the attempt. ' 29
On six occasions during the 1790s the North Carolina Circuit Court
failed to meet because of a similar calamity or illness or death on the part
of one or another of the overburdened judges. Robert H. Harrison of
Maryland, one of Washington's original nominees to the Supreme Court,
declined the position because of the anticipated burdens of riding cir-
cuit.3" Justice Thomas Johnson of Maryland resigned his seat, and Chief
Justice John Jay of New York nearly resigned his, largely because of the
required circuit-riding.31 District Judge Nathaniel Pendleton of Georgia
remarked to Iredell that "[t]he fatigue of so long a journey [on the South-
ern Circuit] twice a year is more than the strength of any man can
bear."32
Congress in 1790 believed that it would have to make adjustments to
the Judiciary Act, and awaited suggestions from the justices.33 The Presi-
dent solicited such suggestions from them as they set out upon their first
29. Letter from James Iredell to Timothy Pickering (June 16, 1798) (Timothy Pickering Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society).
30. Letter from Robert H. Harrison to George Washington (Oct. 27, 1789), reprinted in 1
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 37-38. Harrison was prevailed upon
by Washington and others to reconsider and accept the position, but he almost immediately resigned
due to illness. Id. at 39-43.
31. See letter from Thomas Johnson to George Washington (Jan. 16, 1793), reprinted in I
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 80; letter from John Jay to John
Adams (Jan. 2, 1801), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 146-47;
letter from William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1792), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 732; letter from Benjamin Bourne to William Channing (Feb.
21, 1792), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 733; letter from
Egbert Benson to Rufus King (Dec. 18, 1793), reprinted in 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
RUFUS KING 506-07 (C. King ed. 1894-1900) [hereinafter KING PAPERS].
32. Letter from Nathaniel Pendleton to James Iredell (Mar. 19, 1792), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 344.
33. "It is generally agreed in Congress that the judiciary must undergo alterations," Senator
Pierce Butler observed to a friend in March 1790. Letter from Pierce Butler to Archibald Maclaine
(Mar. 3, 1790) (Pierce Butler Letterbook, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina).
In the second session of the First Congress, a Senate committee appointed to reconsider the Pro-
cess Act (which regulated process in the federal courts) asked the Supreme Court (then assembled
for its ceremonial first session) to "afford them some aid in" drafting revisions. The judges declined
to cooperate, because, they said, Justice John Rutledge of South Carolina did not attend the session,
and "those who attended being unacquainted with the Forms used at the Southward were unwilling
to propose such as should be used in all the States and thought it might be prudent not to do it at
present." Letter from Caleb Strong to John Tucker (Apr. 22, 1790), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
Since the learned John Blair of Virginia did attend that session, and since the justices were again
apparently not directly asked for their advice, it seems likely that the reason given was an "excuse,
without insulting Congress, for not cooperating in what they considered an improper task for the
Court as a whole." Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 23.
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circuits in April.34 When the justices met in New York the following
August for the second session of the Supreme Court, the question of pro-
posing changes to Congress was the primary topic for their considera-
tion, since no judicial business had yet come before them.35 An effective
cure for the ills of circuit-riding was, however, not easy to discover.
Iredell, who had just returned from the Southern Circuit, where he
had been accompanied by Justice John Rutledge of South Carolina, was
already almost frenzied in his desire to avoid that duty again. To his
surprise36 and dismay, he discovered that, in its initial meeting the previ-
ous February (which Iredell had been prohibited from attending due to
the late date of his appointment), the Court had adopted an informal rule
permanently allocating the circuits according to the home states of the
justices. Jay and Cushing had been allotted the nearby Eastern Circuit,
Blair and Justice James Wilson of Pennsylvania had shared the Middle
Circuit, and Iredell and Rutledge had been in their eyes "doomed" 37 to
the Southern Circuit. Rutledge had also been absent from the Court's
first session.
Iredell, at the August 1790 meeting, requested that the rule be al-
tered so that the circuits would be rotated among the justices, or, if rota-
tion were undesirable, so that any permanent assignment of circuit duty
would be accomplished by lot.38 Blair sided with him,39 but Jay, Wilson,
34. Letter from George Washington to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States (Apr. 3, 1790), reprinted in J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 555.
35. See 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 171-83, 484.
36. Iredell had been informed in March of 1790 that "the Judges will take [the Southern Cir-
cuit] in rotation," letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Mar. 18, 1790), reprinted in 2 LiFE
OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 285, but his informant was apparently not aware of the informal
action taken by the justices the preceding month that permanently assigned the circuits. See text
accompanying note 37.
37. Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers,
supra note 28.
38. For the best evidence of what transpired during the August 1790 meeting, see letter from
James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28; letter
from John Blair to James Iredell (July 25, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note
8, at 321-22. See also letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson
(Feb. 11, 1791) (James Iredell Sr. & James Iredell Jr. Papers, Duke University) [hereinafter Iredell
Papers]; letter from William Cushing to John'Adams (Aug. 7, 1790) (Adams Family Papers, Massa-
chusetts Historical Society) [hereinafter Adams Papers]; letter from John Jay to Thomas Johnson
(Mar. 12, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28.
39. The amiable, shy, and judicious Blair, who did not like political infighting, later recalled
that the allotment of circuits in August 1790 was not so permanent as Iredell understood, letter from
John Blair to James Iredell (July 25, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at
322, but his gentler rendition of what occurred during the 1790 meeting in general accords with
Iredell's more hardedged version. Compare letter from John Blair to James Iredell, supra, with James
Iredell letters, supra note 38.
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and Cushing would neither change the rule nor even attempt to obtain
the possibly persuasive opinion (and probably tying vote) of Rutledge,
who was in town but was laid up with the gout and unable to attend in
person.
The Chief Justice was the leader of opposition to Iredell's scheme of
rotation. Jay had a characteristic "unyielding firmness" 4a once he had
taken a position, a distaste for the southern trip that probably exceeded
that of the southerner Iredell,41 and an obvious selfish interest in travel-
ing on circuit close to home. However, the Chief Justice advanced several
other reasons against rotation. Justices could more easily pass upon ap-
plications for admission to the federal bar, he felt, if they were ac-
quainted with applicants more or less from their vicinity.42 More
substantially, he worried that a succeeding pair of justices might reverse
a ruling made by a former pair, causing confusion and delay, or, worse,
distrust of the new federal judiciary.43 Jay's most important and most
persistent argument against rotation concerned the general problem of
how to deal with tough legal issues. If there were rotation, "[j]udges must
hastily decide for farther argument or farther consideration would be ab-
surd" (in the words of Blair's abstract of his minutes of the meeting). 44 It
40. This "was the characterization which John Marshall later made of his friend and predeces-
sor." C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 36 n.2. See J. MARSHALL, 2 THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHING-
TON 215 (1804) (characterizing Jay as possessing "unyielding firmness"). For an informed, balanced,
and arresting view of our undemocratic, commercially-oriented first Chief Justice, who desired and
promoted a strong centralized government at the expense of the sovereignty of the States, see
VanBurkleo, "Honour, Justice, and Interest": John Jay's Republican Politics and Statesmanship on
the Federal Bench, 4 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 239 (1984).
41. See letter from John Jay to Sarah Jay (Apr. 24-25, 1792), reprinted in 3 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 420 (H. Johnston ed. 1890-93) [hereinafter JAY CORRE-
SPONDENCE AND PAPERS]. Jay's notorious diplomatic efforts in the mid-1780s opposing the opening
of the Mississippi River to United States citizens had made him many enemies in some parts of the
South, since many inland Southerners desperately needed a water route to markets. While Jay was,
like most of the other justices, assiduous in attending to his circuit duties, and in addition rarely
missed a circuit session due to illness (perhaps because of his relative youth), he was the only sitting
member of the Supreme Court in the 1790s who never took a tour on the Southern Circuit,
42. Iredell later recalled Jay's having advanced such an argument at the 1790 meeting. Letter
from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28.
43. See letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson (Feb. 11,
1791), Iredell Papers, supra note 38; letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Feb. 13, 1791),
Paine Papers, supra note 25; letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 19, 1793) (John Jay Papers,
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University) [hereinafter Jay Papers].
44. Letter from John Blair to John Jay (Aug. 1790), Jay Papers, supra note 43. Interestingly
enough, Senator Paterson, in the 1789 debates over the Judiciary Act, had indicated that he expected
a method to be used to resolve the problem of difficult issues of law on circuit that approximated the
nisi prius system then in use in England. See Holt, supra note 15, at 367 n.87. "[I]f Qn. is intricate"
on circuit, he thought, the circuit judges would "adjourn that 'Qn.'.] till next Term & take the Opn.
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was usual for circuit-riding judges to postpone hard questions for deci-
sion upon their return, and difficult questions of law had already been
postponed for future decision by Jay and Cushing on the spring 1790
Eastern Circuit trip.45
Jay, Wilson, and Cushing had, however, deeper and more systemic
reasons for opposing Iredell's desires. They were among the Federalists
who thought that the 1789 Act needed revision. While important Feder-
alists such as Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson, at least in the early
1790s, apparently felt that no important changes were necessary, some
Federalists considered that the Judiciary Act had seriously compromised
the potential of the new federal judicial establishment, and wanted a gen-
eral revision of the statute including an elimination of circuit riding. Al-
exander Hamilton had, in the fall of 1789, concurred with "many... in
opinion that [the 1789 Act's] present form is inconvenient, if not imprac-
ticable."46 In order for the national government to "provide for a con-
pleat execution of its laws," Theodore Sedgwick thought, there was a
necessity "of extending its courts thro' the whole extent of the country
and multiplying its officers without number."'47 "[T]he Judiciary System
... is defective throughout, and totally inadequate to its object," another
disgruntled Federalist would soon write.48 Not many Federalists were
as broad, bold or detailed in their desire to strengthen the federal judici-
ary as were Sedgwick and Hamilton, and during the early 1790s most
of the Judges" at the intervening meeting of the Supreme Court. Casto, supra note 18, at 1135
(Paterson's notes). Paterson expected that the whole Court, in other words, would confer upon, and
informally come to a conclusion about each knotty issue rather than, as Jay and Cushing desired,
having the individual circuit justices decide it by themselves. No Justice put forward this solution to
the dilemma in the ensuing years of discussion about rotation and circuit-riding, though a similar
thought is embodied in the en banc scheme of Justice Johnson. See infra text accompanying note
106.
45. Letter from John Jay to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 12, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra
note 28.
46. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert H. Harrison (Nov. 27, 1789), reprinted in 1
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 41. See also letter from George
Washington to Robert H. Harrison (Nov. 27, 1789), reprinted in I SUPREME COURT DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra, at 40.
47. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Peter Van Schaack (Nov. 20, 1791), reprinted in THE
LIFE OF PETER VAN SCHAACK, L.L.D. 436 (H. Van Schaack ed. 1842) [hereinafter LIFE OF VAN
SCHAACK]. Federal District Judge John Lowell of Massachusetts was "fully convinced that in
Massts. the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the US. to all the Objects which the Constn. admits
would be far from unpopular." Letter from John Lowell to Fisher Ames (Jan. 10, 1791) (Fisher
- Ames Papers, Dedham Historical Society, by permission of the Board of Curators) [hereinafter
Ames Papers].
48. Extract of a letter from a Good Federalist in Virginia to his Friend in this City, General
Advertiser, Feb. 11, 1793 (Philadelphia newspaper).
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Federalists who wanted changes were either vague or silent about the
specific ways in which the power and jurisdiction of the federal courts
might be augmented. Nevertheless, despite disagreement among them-
selves about the extent of revision needed, there were many Federalists
who desired changes.
Jay, Cushing, and Wilson were among those who thought that "con-
fining the [Supreme] Judges to their proper place vizt. the Supreme
Court,"4 9 plus concomitant changes providing for the staffing of the cir-
cuit courts, were necessary at the minimum.50 Comfortable in their cir-
cuit assignments, these three justices meant to stand fast against stopgap
measures like rotation, which, if adopted by itself, might tend to dissolve
needed but wavering congressional votes for termination of circuit-rid-
ing. They wanted to wait until Congress could make all the necessary
changes, populating the circuit courts with another set of judges, giving
the Supreme Court nothing but appellate duties at the seat of govern-
ment, and in general placing the federal judiciary "on its proper
footing."51
Most of the August 1790 meeting of the justices was taken up with
adducing the various arguments against any and all circuit riding, since
that was what bothered them the most. Blair's summary of the conversa-
tion listed other reasons for the changes Jay and other Federalists desired
49. Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 19, 1793), Jay Papers, supra note 43.
50. See letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Mar. 26, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note
38. See also letter from William Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1792), reprinted in I SUPREME
COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 732; letter from David Sewall to George
Thatcher (Nov. 25, 1792), Chamberlain Collection, supra note 18; letter from Henry Marchant to
Theodore Foster (Dec. 11, 1792) (Theodore Foster Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society) [herein-
after Foster Papers]; letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Jan. 1, 1793), Foster Papers,
51. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Apr. 30, 1794), reprinted in 4 JAY CORRE.-
SPONDENCE AND PAPERS, supra note 41, at 9. Jay, apparently alone among the justices, took the
position that the Judiciary Act required a permanent assignment of the circuits, and thus that "[t]he
Difficulties attending that subject can ... be removed by Congress only." Letter from John Jay to
James Iredell (Mar. 3, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38. See also letter from John Jay to James
Iredell (Feb. 12, 1791) (Charles E. Johnson Papers, North Carolina State Archives) [hereinafter C.E.
Johnson Papers]. Neither Wilson, Cushing, Blair, nor of course Iredell accepted Jay's reading of the
statute. See letter from James Wilson to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 13, 1792) (Hampton L. Carson
Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania); letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Feb.
13, 1791), Paine Papers, supra note 25; letter from John Blair to James Wilson (Feb. 2, 1791) (Kon-
kle Manuscripts, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College) [hereinafter Konkle Manu-
scripts]; letter from John Blair to James Iredell (July 25, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES
IREDELL, supra note 8, at 321-22; letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James
Wilson (Feb. 11, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra, at 325. Goebel agrees with
the majority's opinion: "The Judiciary Act had specified nothing regarding assignments to the Cir-
cuit Courts .... " J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 557.
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along that line. Among them was the important argument that judges
should never sit upon their own appeals. Blair noted the judges' response
to the counterargument that the two justices who sat on circuit could be
disabled from hearing the appeal: "mutual reversals seem not likely to
put things into a happier train." Another argument, added by Blair but
not discussed at the meeting, was that Congress had given only a single
salary to judges who served in two courts. And a final argument, in the
judges' sole reference to the Constitution, was that that document
seemed to have intended the Supreme Court to be a court of last resort
(except for two instances expressed therein), and to contemplate the staff-
ing of trial courts with "a sett of judges distinct from those of the
supreme court." 52
Accepting the task of developing these notions into a petition of sug-
gestions to be presented to Congress, Jay unilaterally transformed them
into a powerful constitutional argument. As he bluntly summarized:
"We, for our parts, consider the Constitution as plainly opposed to the
appointment of the same persons to both offices, nor have we any doubts
of their legal incompatibility." He added mention of another putative
"deviation from the constitution": by placing the judges of one federal
court, the Supreme Court, into a second set of federal courts, namely the
circuit courts, Congress had usurped the President's constitutional duty
of nominating federal officers.53 Failing to mention any of the practical
difficulties with riding circuit that formed the core of Iredell's complaint
and were the focus of the discussion at the August meeting, Jay then
circulated his draft petition to the other justices for their comment.54
This strongly worded petition never reached Congress, and it is un-
likely that it ever reached the President. In mid-November, Jay drafted a
letter to Washington indicating that none of his colleagues had re-
sponded with their comments, but this portion of the draft was crossed
52. Letter from John Blair to John Jay (Aug. 1790), Jay Papers, supra note 43 (emphasis in
original).
53. Draft of letter from Chief Justice John Jay and Justices of the Supreme Court to George
Washington (Sept. 15, 1790), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTION 161-62 (P. Kurkland &
R. Lerner eds. 1987).
The first of Jay's constitutional propositions, that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require
the justices to perform double duties, was presented to the Court in 1803, and was rejected on the
dubious, but pragmatic, ground that the justices had ridden on circuit for too many years for the
practice to be deemed unconstitutional at that date. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299
(1803).
54. E.g., letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Sept. 13, 1790), Adams Papers, supra note
38; letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Sept. 15, 1790), reprinted in 2 LiFE OF JAMES IREDELL,
supra note 8, at 292.
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out." No response has ever come to light. If none of the justices in fact
responded, perhaps they were hesitant to publicly indicate sharp disa-
greement within the government over the meaning of the Constitution by
accusing the legislature of having acted unconstitutionally, in Jay's direct
and blunt language. After all, the new judicial system was only eighteen
months old when the petition was circulated to the justices. On the other
hand, perhaps they desired to complain about the physical difficulties of
circuit-riding, yet could not find the words to suggest a less harsh or
more comprehensive path to a stubborn and strong-willed Chief who was
clearly regarded by the President as a primary adviser.
The Attorney General, at the end of December 1790, submitted the
report on the judiciary requested by the House of Representatives. 6 The
degree of interaction between Randolph and the justices on this project is
unknown,5 7 but perhaps Jay knew enough about it to conclude that Ran-
dolph's proposal would render less important the justices' delay in mak-
ing suggestions. The proposal contained eloquent arguments for the
termination of circuit-riding by the justices but would have transmuted
the district judges into circuit riders in their place, rather than staff the
circuits separately. Yet Congress surprised the justices by taking no ac-
tion to change the Judiciary Act. In no small part because an opposing
scheme for judiciary reform was also presented, the legislature postponed
all suggested judicial alterations to the first session of the Second Con-
gress, which was to meet the following November.
Iredell meanwhile remained irate at his colleagues' continued refusal
to rotate the circuit assignments. Shortly after the Court's two-day Feb-
ruary 1791 session," and while Jay, Cushing, and Wilson were still inPhiladelphia,5 9 Iredell went to the extreme length of committing to paper
55. Draft of a letter from John Jay to George Washington (Nov. 30, 1790), Jay Papers, supra
note 43. For the version'that was sent, see 3 JAY CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS, supra note 41, at
405-08.
56. See supra text accompanying note 15; Holt, supra note 15, at 344. For the report itself, see 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 21-36.
57. There is a possible allusion to the Attorney General's report in the draft of Jay's letter of
November 13, see draft of a letter from John Jay to George Washington (Nov. 13, 1790), Jay Papers,
supra note 43, and Randolph did ask at least James Wilson for help. See letter from Edmund
Randoph to James Wilson (Aug. 5, 1790) (Society Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). It
is likely that the justices would have been quite interested in the contents of the report. On the other
hand, during much of October and November, and for some lasting through the first week in De-
cember 1790, the justices were riding circuit, and were thus not in Philadelphia to be consulted.
58. The Court sat on February 7 and 8 of that year. For the transcribed proceedings of that
session, see I SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 183-91.
59. The responses of Jay and Cushing to Iredell's letter, see infra note 60, were both postmarked
from Philadelphia. Jay's response implies that Wilson was in Philadelphia, which was the latter's
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all of his arguments in favor of rotation in an extensive circular letter to
his three adversaries.' It is likely that this unusual approach was caused
by Iredell's frustration at continuing to be unable to convince them in
person. The North Carolinian had received no support from any col-
leagues at that session, since Blair failed to attend due to illness, 61 and
Rutledge absented himself because he was in the process of resigning in
order to become Chief Justice of South Carolina.62
"Can any man have a probable chance of going that distance twice a
year, and attending at particular places punctually on particular days?
•.. I am persuaded it is impracticable for any man," Iredell iterated.63
After answering Jay's two chief practical objections with the some-
what ineffectual argument that the first two justices to hear argument in
a difficult case could easily "leave their notes for the 2 subsequent ones,
to instruct them," Iredell came to the real reason for writing at such
length to nearby people about familiar matters. He was upset and an-
gry,64 and was making a record, as lawyers do. If the three continued to
refuse rotation, he promised, "I shall be under the painful necessity of
trying in some manner whether an alteration of the law in that particular
cannot be obtained."6 Iredell threatened to go to Congress to obtain a
home town. See letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Feb. 12, 1791), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra
note 51; letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Feb. 13, 1791), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
Only the two 1790 terms of the Supreme Court were held in New York; the capital moved to
Philadelphia in time for the start of the third session of the First Congress in November 1790,,and
thus the third meeting of the Court in February 1791, and all succeeding terms of the Court for
purposes of this essay, were held also in Philadelphia.
60. See letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson (Feb. 11,
1791), reprinted in 2 LiFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 322-25. Jay's response indicates that
Iredell did not copy the letter out three times, but made it a circular letter that could be hand-
delivered among the three addressees. Letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Feb. 12, 1791), C. E.
Johnson Papers, supra note 51.
61. Letter from John Blair to James Wilson (Feb. 2, 1791), Konkle Manuscripts, supra note 51.
62. Rutledge dated his resignation letter March 5. Letter from John Rutledge to George Wash-
ington (Mar. 5, 1791), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISToRY, supra note 14, at
23.
63. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson (Feb. 11, 1791),
reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 323.
64. This frustration is reflected in the letter of a close friend to Iredell, who, after Jay, Cushing,
and Wilson again turned rotation down, could not "help expressing my astonishment that a repre-
sentation so modest and respectful, yet so strong and firm, of your distressing situation, and inten-
tion of attempting a remedy, did not from mere feelings of generosity, without regard to more
weighty considerations, induce the gentlemen to whom it was addressed, to lighten some part of that
excessive duty with which you have been so unequally overburthened." Letter from Charles Johnson
to James Iredell (spring, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 338.
65. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson (Feb. 11, 1791),
reprinted in 2 LIFE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 325.
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single legislative change where Jay and the other Federalists had failed to
procure more general alterations.
Jay and Cushing both responded equanimously, but both still re-
fused to budge. "[A]n adequate remedy can in my opinion be afforded
only by legislative Provisions," the Chief Justice said. 6 "Whenever the
majority shall determine on a rotation I shall endeavour to do my duty as
well as I can," Cushing promised, comfortably aware that it was unlikely
that such an event would soon occur.67 He added, expressing an optimis-
tic hope then still shared by Jay and Wilson: "[I]t seems probable that
the present inconveniences in the System may, ere long, meet with a leg-
islative remedy."68 Both Jay and Cushing suggested that Iredell arrange
a one-time swap of circuit duties with Blair, who amiably agreed to en-
dure one tour on the Southern Circuit, giving the Middle Circuit to Ire-
dell for the spring of 1791.69
Somewhat mollified, Iredell "volunteered" to accept the Southern
Circuit yet again in the fall of 1791,70 as a part of an agreement that
allowed the President to fill Rutledge's vacated justiceship. In order to
assure the consent of Thomas Johnson of Maryland to be appointed,
Washington had to obtain from the justices at their August 1791 session
a promise that Johnson would not be condemned to the succeeding
Southern tour. In addition, the President assured Johnson "that it is ex-
pected some alterations in the Judicial System will be brought forward at
the next session of Congress, among which [termination of circuit-riding]
may be one."'' 7 Despite all of his antipathies, Iredell this time rode the
66. Letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Feb. 12, 1791), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51.
67. Letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Feb. 13, 1791), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
68. Id.
69. Letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Mar. 16, 1791), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51
(noting receipt of Iredell's lost March 10 letter confirming the circuit assignment swap). "The Cir-
cuits press hard upon us all," the Chief added soothingly, "and your Share of the Task has hitherto
been more than in due proportion." Id.
70. Iredell later said that he went on the Southern Circuit tour "the last time I admit in some
measure voluntarily." Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas John-
son Papers, supra note 28.
71. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Johnson (Aug. 7, 1791), reprinted in I
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 76. Washington had asked the jus-
tices to dine with him, and used this occasion to confer with them on the reasons for Johnson's
recalcitrance and to obtain their consent to excuse him form the Southern Circuit for the fall. Id. For
Johnson's aversion to circuit duty, see letter from Thomas Johnson to George Washington (July 27,
1791), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 73; letter from Thomas
Johnson to George Washington (July 30-Aug. 1, 1791), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra, at 73-74. Johnson accepted the Court appointment, but sat as a Circuit Judge
during the ensuing fall only once, in the important session of the Middle Circuit for Virginia, in
which key British debt cases were heard.
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Southern Circuit alone, in order that the courts might be held.7 2
The Attorney General's report and the other tabled judiciary reform
proposal were to come before Congress at its November 1791 convening.
The loathesomeness of circuit riding made Jay and the other justices at
times optimistically certain that the legislature would at last adopt a
"radical" reform, the adjective used by some Federalists to describe the
changes in the federal judiciary they desired.7" In part because Randolph
had suggested termination of their circuit tours, the justices that fall de-
clined to make any specific recommendations about judiciary changes for
inclusion in the President's annual message.74
However, another important consideration also made them hesitant
to make any suggestions. They feared the potential for clashes arising
from the federal nature of the union, which were inherent in the two
propositions for reform of the federal judiciary. The heart of Attorney
General Randolph's report was the splitting of federal jurisdiction from
state jurisdiction, with a concomitant termination of appellate review by
the Supreme Court over state court judgments on constitutional issues.75
These were unappetizing ideas to the Federalists. The counterproposal,
72. Of the eight courts scheduled to have been held on the Southern Circuit in 1790 and the
spring of 1791, both sessions for North Carolina had been cancelled due to illness among the justices.
One of the three sessions for Georgia had also been cancelled, and only one of the required two
Supreme Court Justices had been present at two of the other sessions. Iredell shared the solicitous
view held by many Federalists that it was important for the circuits to be held on schedule, in order
to accustom local citizens to the existence, presence, and trustworthiness of the new national govern-
ment. It was a serious black mark against the new government, under this view, when the circuits
were not held, especially since litigants, lawyers, jurors, and spectators who had traveled to the court
city all found themselves severely put out. Iredell expressed this view to Justice Johnson the next
spring: "I do expect & intend to go myself [on the Southern Circuit] rather than the Circuit should
be unattended but it is distressing to me in the greatest degree." Letter from James Iredell to Thomas
Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28. In that spring of 1792, when
Iredell had to ride the Southern Circuit alone yet again, the Georgia grand jury felt so aggrieved at
having only one Supreme Court Justice there that it "presented the neglect of the other judges" as a
grievance. Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Apr. 25, 1792), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 346; see also id., at 355-56 (text of grand jury presentment). There
was a great furor when, in spring 1794, the failure of any circuit justice to appear for the Connecticut
circuit court caused two weeks of uncertainty. See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 40-42.
73. For use of the adjective "radical," see letter from Roger Sherman to Simeon Baldwin (Jan.
2, 1.792) (Roger Sherman Collection, Yale University Library) [hereinafter Sherman Papers]; letter
from James Iredell to John Jay (Feb. 16, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38.
74. See letter from George Washington to John Jay (Sept. 4, 1791), reprinted in 31 THE WRrr-
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 354 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931-44); letter from John Jay to George
Washington (Sept. 10, 1791) (State Saltikov-Shchedrin Public Library, Leningrad); letter from John
Jay to George Washington (Sept. 23, 1791), reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHING-
TON 501 (J. Sparks ed. 1838) [hereinafter WASHINGTON WRITNGS].
75. For an analysis of the Randolph and Benson proposals, see the companion essay, Holt,
supra, note 15.
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put forward in the form of a constitutional amendment by Federalist
Representative Egbert Benson, would have cut national costs, preserved
appeals from state courts to the Supreme Court, and eliminated any need
for either circuit-riding or most of the lower federal courts-by federaliz-
ing the supreme courts and the court systems of each state.7 6 Benson's
startling measure was anathema to those who feared a strong central gov-
ernment. The collision between these two judicial plans in a country ex-
hibiting "an administration of justice by two distinct & independent
sovereignties over the same persons, in the same place and at the same
time [might] excite all the agitations of federal and antifederal passions
which now seem to be dormant thro all the northern and eastern States,"
Congressman Sedgwick observed.77 Jay advised the President to raise the
question of judicial reform so "as to cause as few Questions or Divisions
as possible,"78 hoping that political maneuvering behind the scenes
would achieve at least the "radical" changes he desired.
The dilemma presented by the contradictory proposals of Randolph
and Benson exemplified the main reason for the continuing failure of any
thoroughgoing federal judicial reform. Both sides wished for the federal
judiciary to be different from the way it was, and the intricate compro-
mise thrashed out in the 1789 Act was an uneasy one,79 but it neverthe-
less had created a grudgingly acceptable equilibrium. Anti-Federalist
sentiment against what the government's opponents saw as the danger-
ous tendencies of the federal judiciary (indeed, of the whole national gov-
ernment) remained strong 'throughout the 1790s. Fencesitters, and many
who had otherwise given lukewarm support to the new government, were
ignorant or uneasy about the costs or the power of the judiciary, and
might have been induced to join the opposition should an emotional issue
arise. The Federalists had insufficient strength in Congress or in the
76. For Benson's proposal, see 3 FIRST CONGRESS DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at
768-70.
77. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Peter Van Schaack (Nov. 20, 1791), reprinted in LIFE o
VAN SCHAACK, supra note 47, at 436.
78. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Sept. 23, 1791), reprinted in 10 WASHINGTON
WRITINGS, supra note 74, at 501.
79. "The potential threat to the power of the states posed by a national court system with
extensive jurisdiction loomed large among the fears of the Anti-Federalists. Conversely, the potential
consolidation of the power of the national government at the expense of that of the states through
such a juridical structure was primary among the desires of certain Federalists. The compromise
successful enough to secure passage of the [Judiciary Act of 1789] was not necessarily a compromise
which could be guaranteed to continue to please as the courts began their work." Turner, supra note
2, at 29-30.
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countryside to risk the disharmony that probably would have been gener-
ated by advocacy of Benson's plan or of any sort of "radical" reform.
What the federal courts were expected and empowered to do was
already difficult enough to perform. The federal judiciary had been estab-
lished because, as Jay had said in the speech he gave to the first Eastern
Circuit grand juries in the spring of 1790, state jurisprudence "was ac-
commodated to local, not general convenience, to partial, not national
policy."80 Anti-Federalists accurately translated this to mean that the
system of federal courts would be given jurisdiction previously vested
exclusively in state courts over certain branches of criminal, contract,
and property law. Federalists expected the federal courts to act contrary
to state courts by permitting British creditors to collect debts, loyalists to
regain confiscated lands,81 land speculators to obtain or retain title to
land, and out-of-state merchants and creditors to avoid the possibly prej-
udicial passions of local juries-by exercising jurisdiction set forth in the
Constitution or implied therefrom.
For their part, the Anti-Federalists feared that the new courts would
allow states to be sued despite notions of sovereign immunity; that they
would give aliens, out-of-state plaintiffs, and in-state plaintiffs who
claimed title to land under a grant from another state, a safer and more
responsive venue than was provided by state courts; and that they would
refuse to apply, or would even declare unconstitutional, state "stay laws,
their legal tender laws, their legislation as to British debts and loyalist
properties and their State land grants and land titles."82 Finally, Anti-
Federalists feared a concomitant increase in central'power by the exercise
of federal criminal jurisdiction to enforce national policies. In particular,
they worried about federal judicial elimination of that measure of local
control provided by state court juries drawn from the "vicinage," that is,
from citizens who lived near where the crime was committed. All of this
is what the Anti-Federalists meant when they repeatedly claimed that the
federal courts "would eventually absorb and swallow up the State judi-
ciaries."83 While the compromise in the 1789 Act mollified the Anti-Fed-
80. 3 JAY CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS, supra note 41, at 390. See also THE FEDERALIST
No.3 (J. Jay).
81. American state courts had acted in a fashion hostile to British creditors and Tories whose
lands had been confiscated. For the British point of view, see letter from George Hammond to
Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 5, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS
193-200 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds. 1832) (Hammond was British Minister to the United States
and Jefferson was Secretary of State).
82. C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 63.
83. See Genuine Information, supra note 18, at 21 (emphasis in original). Accord, Letters of
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eralists somewhat, Benson's amendment seemed to embody many of
their fears.84
Much of the activity undertaken by the national judiciary through
the fall of 1791 had begun to confirm Anti-Federalist predictions. The
first action of the federal circuit court in North Carolina in 1790 had
been to peremptorily order a state equity court to transfer to it a case that
had been on the state docket for several years involving an out-of-state
plaintiff who feared prejudice in the North Carolina court. Transfer was
ordered even though the federal Judiciary Act apparently granted juris-
diction in such instances only where the non-domiciliany was a defendant
in the state court and then only for cases newly brought in state court.
The federal court order fell like a thunderbolt in a state where Anti-
Federalism had already been strong enough to postpone ratification of
the Constitution. North Carolina judges and legislators vigorously pro-
tested what they viewed as a dangerous example of federal jurisdictional
usurpation.8 5 Moreover, in the fall of 1791, the Georgia circuit court up-
held its jurisdiction in a suit for unpaid Revolutionary procurement debts
brought by a South Carolina citizen against the State of Georgia over a
strong Georgia defense of sovereign immunity.86
Even more important were the substantive cases, most particularly
Centinel, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 5, at i 2.7.14, 2.7.41-42. "It
must be obvious to every one that, if [the federal courts] have such a concurrent jurisdiction, they
must in time take away the business from the state courts entirely. I do not deny the propriety of
having federal courts; but they should be confined to federal business, and ought not to interfere in
those cases where the state courts are fully competent to decide." DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENrTIONS, supra note 18, at 164 (remarks of Spencer on the floor of the first North Carolina
ratification convention).
84. "[A]s a matter of logic and political theory, those who opposed the Constitution strongly
resisted the idea that two sovereign governmental bodies could coexist, share concurrent jurisdiction,
cooperate, and survive. They believed that sovereignty could be divided but not shared," T.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, at 26. Randolph's proposal could thus be seen as representing the
thought of those who opposed the Constitution.
85. The North Carolina case is the subject of a companion essay. See Holt & Perry, Writs and
Rights, "Clashings and animosities" The First Confrontation Between Federal and State Jurisdictions
(accepted for publication by L. & HIsT. REV.). The North Carolina case, in conjunction with Wash-
ington's treaty with the Cherokees (reviled in Georgia), Hamilton's excise tax on whiskey, and his
plan for assumption of State Revolutionary debts, "seem to keep the states of Georgia No. Caro[lin]a
and Virginia in a condition not unlike that of Naples when Vesuvius cuts capers." Letter from Fisher
Ames to Thomas Dwight (Jan. 6, 1791), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF FISHER AMES 845-47 (W.
Allen ed. 1983) [hereinafter WORKS OF AMES].
86. See Ex'r of Farquhar v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga.), 1 Minutes of the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Georgia, 1790-1842, at 33 (May 1790-April 1793) (available on National Archives
microfilm reel M-1 184, RG 21) (state's plea to jurisdiction overruled, Oct. 21, 1791). Upon retrial of
the case before the Supreme Court, the holding below was affirmed over Justice Iredell's dissent.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The State of Georgia refused to appear in the
1987] THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE ENEMIES
those brought by British merchants upon still-unpaid prerevolutionary
debts. "[N]o sooner had the new Circuit Courts begun to function than
the [expected] spate of actions by British creditors commenced, particu-
larly in the Southern states.""7 The merchants, mostly from Glasgow,
London, and Liverpool, began to recover in the Northern federal courts
after a decade of frustration at the hands of the state courts, while the
important cases of Jones v. Walker (in the Virginia Circuit Court), Brail-
sford v. Spalding (in Georgia), and Higginson v. Greenwood (in South
Carolina) had appeared on the dockets and, in the first two instances,
had been argued and were pending decision."8 Although an early case in
the Massachusetts Circuit Court had refused to accept the claim of a
Tory to his confiscated land, two important decisions in the spring of
1791 invalidated a Connecticut statute refusing to allow interest on Brit-
ish debts for the eight-year period of the Revolution. Other important
decisions favorable to British creditors were handed down by the circuit
courts in the early years.8 9 Out-of-state creditors also began to meet with
retrial before the Court, but it did make a special appearance before the circuit court. See infra notes
151-52 and accompanying text.
87. J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 545. See also D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION
72-83 (1971) ("By far the largest number of suits [by British creditors] were instituted in... Virginia
.... Between 1790 and 1795 British creditors secured approximately 500 favorable judgments from
the Virginia circuit court."); M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KEN-
TUCKY 1789-1816, at 155-58 (1978). These two publications constitute the only available studies of
lower federal jurisdiction during the 1790's.
88. See D. HENDERSON, supra note 87, at 72-79. See also Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts
in the Federal Circuit of Virginia, 1790 to 1797, 94 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176 (1984)
(discussing the Virginia Case of Jones v. Walker); J. MOORE, 3 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS
107-108, 161-63, 173-80 (1929-33) (discussing the Georgia case of Brailsford v. Spaulding); C. WAR-
REN, supra note 2, at 66 n.1 (discussing Georgia case); Augusta Chronicle, May 12, 1792 (discussing
Georgia case); The Providence Gazette and Country Journal, Dec. 7, 1793 (discussing the South
Carolina case of Higginson v. Greenwood). Also, the papers for the Georgia case of Brailsford v.
Spaulding are available in the Georgia Federal Court Files (RG21), at the East Point, Georgia
Branch of the National Archives. The Rhode Island Federal Circuit Court in 1792 held unconstitu-
tional as "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" a state law postponing for three years any legal
debt-collection action against a named individual, thereby aiding both British and out-of-State credi-
tors. Champion v. Casey (C.C.D. R.I. 1792), discussed in The Providence Gazette and Country
Journal, June 16, 1792.
89. See, e.g., Murray v. Meriam (C.C.D. Mass.), I United States Circuit Court for the District
of Massachusetts, Final Records, 1790-99, (Massachusetts Federal Court Files, RG 21, National
Archives, Waltham, Mass.); Elliot v. Sage and Deblois v. Hawley (C.C.D. Conn.), Records of the
Circuit Court [for Connecticut] from the April 1790 Term to the September 1796 Term (Connecti-
cut Federal Court Files, RG 21, National Archives, Waltham, Mass.). See also J. MOORE, supra note
88, at 106-07, 158-59, 173 (discussing Murray v. Meriam); C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 65-68;
Connecticut Courant, May 9, 1791 (Hartford newspaper); Massachusetts Spy, May 12, 1791
(Worcester newspaper).
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success in the new federal courts.9" All of these trends had begun to be-
come evident by the spring and fall circuits of 1791, and became increas-
ingly prominent through the 1790s.
An indication of the strength of Anti-Federalist opposition to the
federal judiciary is given in a pertinent 1791 letter from western Penn-
sylvania. The letter arose in the context of the Whiskey Rebellion, a vig-
orous trans-Appalachian refusal to pay a backbreaking excise tax on
distilled grain that Congress had enacted in the summer of 1791 at the
insistence of Alexander Hamilton.91 Whiskey was not only a frontier ne-
cessity (because of living conditions, especially loneliness and fear of
armed attack), and the most useful form of currency, but was also the
sole exportable commodity in a poor region lacking specie and cut off
from markets for heavier produce by the Appalachian Mountains and by
British and Spanish control over the river routes. A practically bloodless
backcountry rebellion throughout the 1790s in almost all of the old
West-from transmontane Pennsylvania and Virginia through Ohio,
Kentucky, and Tennessee to upcountry South Carolina and Georgia-
the Whiskey Rebellion was to John Marshall92 and other contemporary
Federalists the single most dangerous event of the nation's first quarter
century, because, until Jefferson's election in 1800, it would remind the
national regime of its shaky popular foundation.
The November 1791 letter protested the way the federal judiciary
was set up to handle problems that might emerge from the tax protest,
thereby prefiguring quite well the treatment the Whiskey Rebels would
90. D. HENDERSON, supra note 87, at 83; M. TACHAU, supra note 87, at 149-51, 162-66 (finding
"groundless" the "fear that the federal courts would favor out-of-state litigants" on the grounds that
plaintiffs almost always won and plaintiffs "were probably as often Kentuckians as non-Kentucki-
ans"): Tachau does not offer proof that Kentucky residents brought diversity cases in the early
Kentucky federal courts with a similar frequency to out-of-staters; nor does she indicate how juris-
diction over the defendants might have been obtained in such instances. Not much has been done on
property law in the early federal courts-that is, on litigation involving the important issues of land
speculation and Loyalist titles.
91. See generally T. SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, at 11-27, 61-74, 93-108, 125-42, 169-89, 199-
203, 206-12, 226-28, 275 n.21; Slaughter The Friends of Liberty, the Friends of Order, and the Wils-
key Rebellion, in THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 24-27 & nn.35-36
(S. Boyd ed. 1985) [hereinafter WHISKEY REBELLION]; Tachau, A New Look at the Wh1iskey Rebel-
lion, in WHISKEY REBELLION, supra, at 97-118; Tachau, George Washington and the Reputation of
Edmond Randolph, 73 J. AM. HIST. 15, 19-23, 26-28 (1986).
Resistance to federal excise taxes in the 1790s was not confined to the West. See T. SLAUGHTER,
supra note 21, at 206-14 (eastern rural areas); Baumann, Philadelphia's Manufacturers and the Ex-
cise Tax of 1794; The Forging of the Jeffersonian Coalition, in WHISKEY REBELLION, supra, at 135-
64 (urban areas).
92. 2 J. MARSHALL, supra note 40, at 411; 5 id. at 170-90, 425.
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eventually receive from 1794 to 1795 at the hands of the federal courts.93
Since the whole State of Pennsylvania was now one federal judicial dis-
trict, "A Citizen" noted, Pittsburghers accused of federal whiskey tax
violations could be taken across the state for trial in Philadelphia by un-
known jurors, a possibility likened to pre-Revolutionary British practices
of hauling accused colonials to trial in England.94 Trial by jury in the
vicinage of the crime, "where there is a mutual acquaintance, and each
knows every man by whom he may be judged," gave the populace both a
check against tyranny and a part in self-government, "a share of Judica-
ture which they have reserved for themselves." Founded upon twin "in-
decent supposition[s]" that state courts "have not spirit and integrity to
do justice" and that "in some parts juries will sacrifice their consciences
to their passions," the federal judiciary, "A Citizen" predicted, would
aggrandize its already broad jurisdiction by accepting false but nonrebut-
table allegations, as the English courts had notoriously done, to take
"causes legally cognizable only before the state courts."9"
93. See Ifft, Treason in the Early Republic: The Federal CourtsPopular Protest,and Federalism
During the Whiskey Insurrection, in WHISKEY REBELLION, supra note 91, at 165.
94. Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser, Dec. 20, 1791 (Philadelphia newspaper) (anonymous
letter published under the pseudonym "A Citizen," dated Nov. 19, 1791, and datelined "Washington
County, Pa.").
95. Id.
Well-organized popular assemblies to protest the excise tax had met in the area in July and Au-
gust of 1791, with a particularly large one having met on September 7, in Pittsburgh. Robert John-
son, collector of the excise for Allegheny and Washington Counties, had been tarred and feathered in
Washington County on September 11. See T. SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, at 109-18. These events
probably gave rise to the analysis of the judicial possibilities discussed in the above letter.
Similarly Whiggish activity-local protest meetings opposing the federal excise tax and symbolic
violence to governmental officials and others who tried to collect it-would occur again in the west-
ern portion of Pennsylvania in August 1792, June and November 1793, and March and June-Sep-
tember 1794. Sporadic activity of a similar nature occurred in many other states during this time,
including tidewater Virginia and Maryland. But protest was most widespread and organized in west-
ern Pennsylvania, and only in western Pennsylvania were there any substantial citizens willing to
pay or try to collect the tax. Despite the central government's attempt to keep news of the Rebellion
in locales other than Pennsylvania from reaching public attention in the seaboard states, see T.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, at 118 & n.24, the Whiskey Rebellion would continue to influence Con-
gressional attitudes on judicial reform through the mid-1790s.
The November 1791 letter represented a widespread view among the excise tax protesters. It is
clear that the protesters saw themselves as gloriously and righteously partaking in the tradition of
refusal to pay undesired, colonialist excise taxes enacted by distant and unresponsive legislatures,
including the Stamp Act and Tea Act riots, which were now enshrined in myth and culture as
legitimate. See J. CARNAHAN, The Pennsylvania Insurrection of 1794, Commonly Called the 'Whis-
key Insurrection,' 3 PRoc. N. J. HIsT. Soc'y 118-20 (1852); T. SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, passim.
Their rhetoric of protest was essentially that used by the Patriots during the Revolution and then by
the Anti-Federalist opponents of a centralizing Constitution, which (they thought) effectively dises-
tablished the notion of popular democratic representation for which they had fought. This was
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The first case in the Supreme Court, in February 1791, also excited
Anti-Federalist passions since it was a suit by an alien against the sup-
posedly sovereign State of Maryland. 96 One contemporary observer
wrote that the case would decide whether "the several States have relin-
thought to have been accomplished by constitutional provisions for an aristocratic and indirectly
elected Senate, an indirectly elected President, and a House of Representatives that was far too small
to be genuinely representative-and with no requirements (as under the Articles of Confederation)
for short terms or for rotation in federal office. See Sharp, The Whiskey Rebellion and the Question of
Representation, in WHISKEY REBELLION, supra note 91, at 119-33; Nedelsky, Confining Democratic
Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 340
(1982).
Alexander Hamilton, representing many Federalists in and out of the government, understood
the danger of the broad conception and emerging tradition of popular democracy portended by the
Revolution, Shays Rebellion, the formation of Vermont and the attempted formation of many other
States in the backcountry portions of existing states and beyond the Ohio, the Whiskey Rebellion,
and other resistance to the new government- personalized by the excise protesters, made concrete
both by well-founded rumors in Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee of conspiracies with the Spanish
and British governments and by widespread resistance in Georgia to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm. See supra note 85; infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text; Conference Concerning the
Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania, reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 12 &
nn.13, 15 (H. Syrett ed. 1972) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS].
Hamilton and United States District Attorney William Rawle helped to congeal sporadic protest
into open revolt by issuing process to try western tax delinquents in federal court in Philadelphia
rather than in state court in Pittsburgh, using the federal courts just as Anti-Federalists had feared.
Then Hamilton, abetted heartily by President Washington and other Federalists at the seat of gov-
ernment, persuaded the Congress to raise a militia army of 13,000--as large as any army the Patriots
had put in the field during the Revolution- with orders to smash backcountry protest once and for
all with an old-style, overawing show of force. See letter from William Bradford to Alexander Ham-
ilton (Aug. 23, 1784), reprinted in 17 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra, at 129-30; Kohn, The Washington
Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972); T. SLAUGH-
TER, supra note 21, at 190-99, 203-04, 212-221, 277 n.40. Western excise tax evasion continued on a
grand scale, however, until Jefferson's election.
To symbolize the delegitimation of the Whiggish protest, fourteen of the 1794 "rebels" were
federally indicted for the novel common-law misdemeanor of liberty "pole-raising"! See P. GIuE,
supra note 21, at 52-58; Ifft, supra note 93; Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in AL-
BION'S FATAL TREE 17-63 (1975).
96. Van Stophorst v. Maryland (U.S. 1791-92) (unreported); see Fine Minutes of the Supreme
Court (Aug. 1791 term to Feb. 1793 term), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note 14, at 191-92, 195-96, 198, 201, 207; Engrossed Docket of the Supreme Court (Feb.
1791 term), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY supra at, 484-86. Van
Stophorst was discontinued by consent of the parties in August 1792. Fine Minutes of the Supreme
Court (Aug. 1792 term), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 201.
The second case in the Supreme Court, however, presented the same issue and eventuated in a
judgment against the State of New York for $5315. Oswald v. New York (U.S. 1795) (unreported);
see Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court (Feb. 1792 term to Feb 1795 term), reprinted in 1 SUPREME
COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 198, 200-02, 216-18, 232, 234; Engrossed Docket of the
Supreme Court (Aug. 1792 term to Feb. 1794 term), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra, at 486, 491-92. The seventh case in the Supreme Court not only raised the
same issue but involved the touchy matter of land speculation, since the plaintiff was essentially the
Indiana Company. Grayson v. Virginia (U.S. 1798) (unreported), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT
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quished all their SOVEREIGNTIES, and have become mere corpora-
tions upon the establishment of the General Government. 97 If the
decision went against Maryland, the writer continued, the result would
be that "each State in the Union may-be sued by the possessors of their
public securities." 98 The Anti-Federalist leader James Sullivan of Massa-
chusetts was so alarmed at the possibility of "a consolidation of all the
governments into one" if jurisdiction over Maryland were to be accepted
by the Supreme Court that he published an extensive pamphlet on the
case.99 The activities of the federal courts had begun to agitate Anti-Fed-
eralist fears about the national government, and it was not a propitious
time to consider judiciary changes.
Although Senator Samuel Johnston wrote at the beginning of the
congressional session in November 1791 to his brother-in-law, Iredell,
that he was doing everything in his power to keep alive the idea of judi-
cial reform,"°° Congress decided to concentrate on fiscal policy, Indian
affairs, and the debt to France, and thereby avoided a resuirection of
federal versus anti-federal battles over the judiciary. The Randolph and
Benson proposals were buried in committees where they died.101 Despite
Federalist Congressman William Smith's mid-February hope that Con-
gress would "in this Session abolish the system of making the Judges of
the Supreme Court ride the Circuits throughout the Union,"" it was
clear by January to most acute observers that "no radical reform of the
Judiciary law will be made."'0 3 Disgusted at the congressional recalci-
trance to end his exhausting circuit-riding duties, Jay allowed his name
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 216, 245, 272, 278, 282-83, 289 & n.267, 291, 303 n.303, 305,
dismissed sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 378 (1798).
97. Extract of a letter from Philadelphia, dated February 1791, Newport Mercury, Mar. 24,
1791 (article datelined "Boston, March 3").
98. Id.
99. J. SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 30 (1791).
100. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Nov. 13, 1791), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 335-36.
101. Two attempts were made in the House of Representatives to consider the proposals, but
both were ended by referral to committee. The tortured path, back and forth between committee and
floor, is detailed in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 2, at 14 n.40.
102. Letter from William Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1792), repinted in 1 SUPREME
COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 732.
103. Letter from Roger Sherman to Simeon Baldwin (Jan. 2, 1792), Sherman Papers, supra note
73. Accord letter from Henry Van Schaack to Theodore Sedgwick (Dec. 18, 1791) (Sedgwick Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society) [hereinafter Sedgwick Papers]. As one Federalist observer euphe-
mistically put it, "[p]remature attempts to amend, may check the good and increase the Evils of the
present System." Letter from Peter Van Schaack to Theodore Sedgwick (Dec. 25, 1791), Sedgwick
Papers, supra.
1987]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to be placed in nomination against the six-term incumbent, George Clin-
ton, for the governorship of New York and would have resigned from the
Supreme Court had he won the election."°
The two justices facing another tour on the Southern Circuit now
escalated their attempts to obtain rotation. Thomas Johnson anxiously
awaited news of "very necessary" legislative reform, 10 5 and attempted to
meet Jay's argument about the reservation of difficult points of law with
a practical suggestion. He asked a friend in Congress to propose legisla-
tion empowering circuit judges "to adjourn cases of difficulty into the
Supreme Court" where the legal questions might be answered en bane
and the case sent back down. The friend, however, reported that neither
"that or either of several other Hints will gain attention." Johnson, too,
was contemplating resignation because of circuit duty. 106
James Iredell emphatically informed Jay that, whatever legislation
might eventuate in 1792, he would not "go the Southern Circuit soon
again." 10 7 When the Court convened for its February term, Iredell re-
quested a special meeting of the justices to deal with circuit duty. 108 Jay
was absent due to the precarious health of his pregnant wife, and John-
son's own health kept him away.10 9 Wilson and Cushing remained op-
posed to rotation, accurately reflecting Jay's unchanged views;t t0 thus,
Johnson and Iredell were forced, despite all their protestations, to under-
take the Southern Circuit yet again.1I' But Iredell had expected this, and
had prepared an ingenious substitute proposal to be presented to Con-
104. Letter from William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1792), reprinted in 1
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 732 ("[Mr. Jay ... was seven months
in the Year from his family, traveling about the Country."); see also letter from Benjamin Boume to
William Channing (Feb. 21, 1792), reprinted in 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra, at 733 ("[H]e did not consent to the use of his Name untill on enquiry he was told there was
no likelihood of an alteration of the present arrangement of the Federal Judiciary."); letter from
Egbert Benson to Rufus King (Dec. 18, 1793), reprinted in 1 KING PAPERS, supra note 31, at 506-07.
105. Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Wilson (Mar. 1, 1792), reprinted in I SUPREME
COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 733-34.
106. Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Iredell (Mar. 31, 1792), C. E. Johnson Papers,
supra note 51.
107. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay (Jan. 17, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38.
108. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay (Feb. 16, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38; letter
from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28.
109. 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 196 n.108.
110. See letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Mar. 3, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38;
letter from John Jay to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 12, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers, supra note 28.
111. Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Iredell (Mar. 9, 1792), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra
note 51; letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers,
supra note 28. Johnson's illness prevented his going on the circuit, so Iredell had to ride it alone, as
he had predicted.
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gress: each justice would agree to give up $500 per year of his salary-
one-seventh of the salary of an associate justice and one-eighth of Jay's-
if circuit-riding were terminated." 2
Wilson, Blair, and, as soon as he was informed, Johnson immedi-
ately agreed to the plan, but Cushing balked and equivocated until he
could consult with Jay.113 When Jay learned about the plan from a friend
in Massachusetts, he diffidently agreed to take a $500 "Deduction in case
we are retrieved entirely from the Circuits." '114 Cushing then also went
along, agreeing only "if the thing can be fairly affected, as the Ch. Justice
has stated it." Both still thought that "the Sentiments of Congress on this
point should be pretty well ascertained before the Proposal is made,"
since, as Cushing was at pains to point out to Iredell, "such an alteration
would require appointments of new Judges for the circuit business and
new Salaries which could not be compensated out of 500 drs." 115 The
interlocking nature of the provisions of the Judiciary Act, and resulting
costs, made such an alteration much less likely. There is no evidence that
Iredell's salary reduction proposal was ever presented to Congress.
A spirit of frustration and conflict now came to characterize the
Court. Iredell, for example, was fed up with asking for collegial support.
He took it upon himself to communicate directly with President Wash-
ington concerning the judiciary,116 bypassing Jay and, in a sense, declar-
ing his independence from the Chief Justice. More importantly, he
followed through on his previously announced plan to use his own polit-
ical connections to obtain rotation from Congress on an ad hoe basis. "I
have some hopes," he had written mildly to Jay just after what he called
the justices' "ineffectual conference" in mid-February, that "Congress
112. Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers,
supra note 28.
113. "I confess I was astounded at Mr. Cushing's hesitation; and can only account for it by his
finding travelling in the midst of his N.E. Friends much cheaper than any of the rest of us do I
believe." Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792), Thomas Johnson Papers,
supra note 28.
114. Letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Mar. 19, 1792) (copy enclosed in letter from John
Jay to William Cushing (Mar. 19, 1792)), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
115. Letter from William Cushing to James Iredell (Mar. 26, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note
38.
116. See letter from James Iredell to George Washington (Feb. 23, 1792), repHnted in 2 LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 338. Although Washington's April 1790 letter asking for advice
from the justices had been sent to each of them, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, Iredell was
the only associate justice ever to respond directly to the President, so far as the records of the 1790s
demonstrate. All other communication along this line was channeled through the Chief Justice.
Iredell in his February 23 letter did not, however, mention termination of circuit-riding duties, but
rather confined himself to other difficulties he had encountered on circuit.
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will amend the law as to whether there shall or shall not be a rota-
tion."' 7 Iredell turned to Senator Johnston, who was influential in judi-
cial matters and effective in congressional politicking. It is not unlikely
that Johnston dissuaded Iredell from pressing the $500 salary reduction
proposal, since it would involve frustrating complications. The change to
required rotation went quickly through Congress, since by itself it did
not excite any federalism tensions and did not greatly disturb the intri-
cately interlocking scheme into which circuit-riding had been fitted. On
March 20 Johnston got the Senate to agree to instruct a committee "to
bring in a clause to establish such rotation in the attendance of the judges
at the circuit courts as may best apportion the burthen." 8 The bill so
drafted was approved by the Senate the next day. The House voted in
favor, with some nongermane amendments, on April 9, the Senate con-
curred once more the following day, and Washington's signature on
April 13 rendered the Judiciary Act of 1792 into law.' 19
Jay, riding circuit, heard rumors of the bill and commented deject-
edly to his wife "perhaps it [rotation] may not take place, or be of short
duration."' 2 1 However, the first substantive alteration of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 required the justices at each session "in writing subscribed
with their names" to assign the circuits so that "no judge, unless by his
own consent, shall have assigned to him any circuit which he hath al-
ready attended, until the same hath been afterwards attended by every
other of the said judges."12 1 Iredell had bested Jay in this test of will and
desire, having achieved a partial reform where the Chief Justice had held
out for "radical" change.12 2 It took some of the wind out of the sails of
Jay's hitherto remote and singleminded leadership, paradoxically bring-
ing the Court closer together amidst its estrangement from Congress.
"Mr. Jay grows infinitely upon intimacy," Iredell would later write to his
wife when Jay joined him on circuit for the first and only time. 23
117. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay (Feb. 16, 1792), Iredell Papers, supra note 38.
118. See SENATE JOURNAL 412-13 (1792).
119. An Act for Altering the Times of Holding the Circuit Courts, in Certain Districts of the
United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 252 (1792) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1792].
120. Letter from John Jay to Sarah Jay (Apr. 24-25, 1792), reprinted in 3 JAY CORRESPON-
DENCE AND PAPERS, supra note 41, at 420 (emphasis in original).
121. Judiciary Act of 1792, supra note 119, § 3.
122. "1 congratulate you on the interposition of Congress in your behalf against the tyranny and
injustice of your brothers of the bench," wrote one North Carolina friend obviously aware of Ire-
dell's fury over the problem. Letter from William R. Davie to James Iredell (May 25, 1792), Iredell
Papers, supra note 38; see also letter from John Haywood to James Iredell (June 18, 1792), Iredell
Papers, supra.
123. Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 20, 1793), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra
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The only important action taken by the Supreme Court during the
1790s that received widespread approval from Anti-Federalists occurred
immediately after the judges' disappointment over the failure of judicial
reform in the winter of 1792. Congress that same winter had saddled the
justices, as members of the circuit courts, with the administrative duty of
inspecting the veracity and nature of pension claims of invalided Revolu-
tionary War veterans. The judges were required in each instance to cer-
tify the degree of infirmity and to recommend to the Secretary of War
whether a pension should ensue, and in what amount. The Secretary
could accept or reject their findings.124 This gave the justices "something
of substance upon which to base their constitutional objections to Circuit
duty." '25 When confronted with claims from pensioners on the spring
circuits, the justices severally, but apparently concertedly and unani-
mously, declared that the courts of the United States could not be com-
manded to perform such administrative duties consistently with the
constitutional requirement that the judiciary be separate from the other
branches of the government.' 26 This refusal probably represented more a
note 51. Interestingly, Jay and Iredell differed sharply on one of the crucial questions presented on
that spring 1793 Virginia circuit. After several postponements, frustrating in the extreme to British
creditors because of the enormous amount of prerevolutionary debt still unpaid in the Old Domin-
ion, the four legal defenses relied upon in Virginia by the debtors to bar federal court jurisdiction of
these cases were finally decided by Jay, Iredell, and the district judge, Cyrus Griffin. The court
unanimously overruled the defenses dealing with Virginia's 1779 statute escheating British property,
Virginia's 1782 statute prohibiting the recovery of British debts within the Commonwealth unless
assigned to a Virginia citizen before May 1777, and the failure of the British to perform their duties
under the 1783 peace treaty, thus supposedly justifying Virginian recalcitrance to pay British credi-
tors. On the fourth, however, Iredell and Griffin voted to allow payment by debtors of British
merchants, in deflated Continental or other wartime currency, into the Treasury of Virginia, pursu-
ant to another wartime Virginia statute, to count as payment of the debts; Jay dissented. Warre v.
Daniel L. Hylton & Co. (C.C.D. Va. 1793), United States Circuit Court Order Book No. I (May 22,
1790 to June 8, 1795) (United States Circuit Court Files, Virginia State Library). See also Hobson,
supra note 88, at 185-92. The Supreme Court later reversed on the fourth plea, upholding Jay's
dissent in the circuit court. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
Consonant with the increased harmony on the Court, Iredell thereafter resumed the practice of
channelling his ideas for alterations of the Judiciary Act through the Chief Justice. See letter from
James Iredell to John Jay (Jan. 21, 1794), Jay Papers, supra note 43.
124. An Act to Provide for the Settlement of the Claims of Widows and Orphans Barred by the
Limitations Heretofore Established, and to Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, ch. 10, §§ 2-4, 1
Stat. 243-44 (1792). For discussion of the whole incident, see Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 2, at
10-17; J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 560-64; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 69-77. The glee with which
some Anti-Federalists greeted the Court's decision to refuse to obey Congress is especially apparent
from the latter source.
125. J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 560.
126. The protests of the justices, issued from the bench in various spring circuit courts and then
sent to President Washington in separate letters, are collected in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MIS-
CELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 49-53. Only Thomas Johnson, who did not ride circuit in the spring
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protest of Congress's failure to discontinue their circuit duty, and a con-
comitant, defiant willingness to disregard Anti-Federalist strength by
openly demonstrating divisions within the government over the meaning
of the Constitution, than it did a thought-out, consistent, and strongly-
believed-in theory of the separation of powers. 127 This conclusion is evi-
denced by Jay's quasi-cabinet status as adviser to Washington; Jay's and
Chief Justice Ellsworth's later acceptances of foreign ambassadorships
(while continuing as Supreme Court Justices) without the slightest ex-
pression of concern from any justice about the same constitutional divid-
ing-line; the many occasions of formal and informal, but official, contacts
between individual justices and officials of the other branches; 128 and the
of 1792, is not on record among the sitting members of the Court with regard to the invalid pension-
ers' claims duty.
127. The justices, who clearly were concerned about separation-of-powers problems, see Ire-
dell's Reasons for acting as a Commissioner on the Invalid Act (Oct. 1792) (personal memorandum),
C.E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51; Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 2, probably accepted a rough
distinction between the federal courts, which must be kept separate from the intrusions of other
branches, and federal judges, who might with impunity interact individually with those other
branches. When, in the summer of 1793, the executive branch officially asked for "the opinions of
the judges of the Supreme Court" on matters of concern to the nation's peace and conduct of foreign
affairs "under circumstances which do not give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the country,"
letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice John Jay (July 18, 1793), reprinted in 3 JAY CORRI!-
SPONDENCE AND PAPERS, supra note 41, at 486-87 (emphasis in original), the justices respectfully
refused to answer, noting that their position as "judges of a court in the last resort" argued "against
the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to." Letter from John Jay James
Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and William Paterson to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793),
reprinted in 3 JAY CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS, supra, at 487-88. But the fact that they were
willing, as individuals, to perform tasks in circumstances in which they might later individually or
collectively be called upon to issue judicial opinions demonstrates that their theory of separation of
powers was neither very elaborate nor presented remotely as rigid a dividing line between the
branches as modern theorists would contend to be the sine qua non of any separation-of-powers
doctrine. They were practical politicians and judges attempting to get a new system started, not
isolated jurisprudential thinkers elaborating an ideal scheme.
128. Many of these contacts are detailed in this essay, as a justice would attempt to obtain
passage of pertinent judiciary legislation. It was clearly expected by Congress that the justices would
communicate their suggestions for revision of the system, and we have seen how a committee of the
Senate attempted to meet with the Court as a whole in its first term in February 1790 to get advice
on changes in the Process Act. See supra note 33. An act of August 1790, providing for a reduction
of the public debt, appointed the Chief Justice to be one of the commissioners of the "sinking fund"
established thereby, and another in April 1792 made Jay an inspector of coinage produced at the
Mint. An Act Making Provision for the Reduction of the Public Debt, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 186 (1790);
An Act Establishing a Mint, and Regulating the Coins of the United States, ch. 24, § 18, 1 Stat. 246,
250 (1792).
In the fall of 1792, when events in western Pennsylvania that would eventually lead to the Whis-
key Rebellion were causing grave concern at the capital, see supra note 91, Secretary of the Treasury
Hamilton consulted with his friend the Chief Justice about the best way to deal with the resistance.
He bluntly suggested to Jay that "one point for consideration will be the expediency of the next
Circuit Court's noticing the state of things in that quarter." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
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fact that all the justices, except Wilson, actually performed the pension
claims work.129 The justices continued their pension protest on the fall
circuits, despite Federalist fears that, by their "indiscreet and erroneous"
action, "they embolden the States and their courts to make many claims
of power, which otherwise they would not have thought of."13
In light of their arduous pension duty, and with the prospect of hav-
ing to take the Southern Circuit now facing them all, the justices decided
to petition Congress for the first time1"' with a request to terminate their
circuit-riding. At their August 1792 session they agreed to felicitous lan-
guage drafted by Iredell that did not mention the constitutional deficien-
cies Jay had concentrated on in September 1790. The fact that they had
to hear appeals from their own decisions was noted to be "unfriendly to
impartial justice" and to public confidence in the Court.'32 Chief empha-
sis was, however, placed upon the practical difficulties that attended cir-
cuit riding "from New Hampshire to Georgia," in bad weather and harsh
terrain, for a handful of men who neither "enjoy[ed] health and strength
John Jay (Sept. 3, 1792), reprinted in 17 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 95, at 316-17. At Hamil-
ton's request, Jay conferred with their New York Federalist friend Senator Rufus King, thus mixing
all three branches, and reported their joint advice that "neither a proclamation nor a particular
charge by the court to the G. Jury would be adviseable at present." Letter from John Jay to Alexan-
der Hamilton (Sept. 8. 1792), reprinted in 17 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra, at 334-35 (emphasis in
original).
Especially these last events could be expected to come before the justices, either on circuit or
sitting as the Court. It is clear that no bright line of separation between the judges and the rest of the
government had suggested itself to the members of the Supreme Court during this period. See supra
note 127.
129. Except for the adamant legalist Wilson, the justices decided to treat the statutory com-
mand as a congressional request for help, which they then meekly accepted and went to work.
Iredell, who rode with Wilson on circuit in the fall, wrote to his wife: "The Invalid-business has
scarcely allowed me one moment's time, and now I am engaged in it by candle-light... at three in
the morning." Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Oct. 4, 1792), reprinted in 2 LIFE OF
JAMES IREDELL, supra note 8, at 362.
130. Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (Apr. 25, 1792), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF
AMES, supra note 85, at 942. Congress repealed sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Pension Act the following
winter so as to relieve circuit judges of their inspection duties, thereby terminating the justices'
protest. An Act to Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, ch. 52, § 1, 1 Stat. 324 (1793).
131. The September 1790 petition written by Jay was apparently never approved by all the
Justices and certainly never reached congressional attention. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
132. The judges' petition to Congress was dated only one day after Attorney General Randolph
showed cause in the Supreme Court as to why he should be allowed to proceed there ex officio on a
motion for a mandamus to the Pennsylvania Circuit Court to hear the pension claim of one William
Hayburn. 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 203. The contrast
presented "a trenchant illustration of the incompatibility argument," J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at
562, since to hear Randolph would be to review the decision on Hayburn that some of their number
had made on circuit.
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of body" nor desired "to pass the greater part of their days on the road,
and at Inns, and at a distance from their families," and who in addition
had to hold two sessions of the Supreme Court "in the two most severe
seasons of the year." 133 While the justices politely did not "suggest what
alterations or system ought in their opinion to be formed and adopted,"
it was clear that only a termination of their circuit duties would allow
them to be "relieved from their present painful and improper
situation."13 4
The justices hoped that this eloquent and diplomatic statement of
their practical difficulties, presented just after their declarations that the
Pension Claims Inspection Act was unconstitutional,1 3 5 would sway a
Congress that supposedly viewed the 1789 Act as experimental, that ex-
pected suggestions on the subject from the justices, and that (they
thought) had already struggled through most of the divisive problems
facing the new government. 1
36
Congress did quickly take up the justices' petition,1 37 and at least
two district judges1 38 expected that a portion of Randolph's report would
be adopted, freezing the Supreme Court at the seat of government while
placing the district judges "upon wheels." 139 The Chief Justice, usually
133. Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and
Thomas Johnson to the Congress of the United States (Aug. 9. 1792), reprinted in I AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 52. Drafts of the petition are entirely in Iredell's
hand. See C. E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51.
The Justices asked the President to "lay it before the Congress," letter from John Jay, William
Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and Thomas Johnson to George Washington
(Aug. 9, 1792) (cover letter), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra note
14, at 51-52, which he did on November 7. Washington also mentioned the justices' petition and'
asked in general terms for reform of the judiciary in his annual message, delivered on November 6.
George Washington's Fourth Annual Address to Congress (Nov. 6, 1792), reprinted in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, at 205-12 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939).
134. Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and
Thomas Johnson to the Congress of the United States (Aug. 9, 1792), reprinted in I AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 52.
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. Letter from Samuel Otis to John Adams (Nov. 17, 1792), Adams Papers, supra note 38.
138. See letter from David Sewall to George Thatcher (Nov. 25, 1792), Chamberlain Collection,
supra note 18; letter from Henry Marchant to Benjamin Bourne (Nov. 30, 1792) (Peck Collection,
Rhode Island Historical Society).
139. Letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Jan. 1, 1793), Foster Papers, supra note
50. The Senate committee that took the matter up, see letter from Fisher Ames to David L. Barnes
(Dec. 12, 1792) (Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia), apparently temporarily
adopted a compromise version of Randolph's proposal, whereby a single justice "only %ill sit in each
Circuit Court, with two District Judges." Letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Dec. 1I,
1792), Foster Papers, supra note 50. Perhaps listening to the complaint that "for one Court, or its
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knowledgeable, politically astute, and cautious, wrote to Cushing in early
January 1793 that the "alterations we have suggested" were still being
considered, although "hitherto but little Attention appears to have been
paid to" them."4
Jay was, however, again too optimistic. In December it had already
become likely that, despite the judges' plea, no "radical" changes were to
be obtained from this Congress either.141 One of the Federalist Congress-
men desirous of such changes blamed continuing federal-antifederal ten-
sions: "[T]ime has not disclosed, much less prepared the people to
remedy all the defects of our Judicial arrangements."142 Thomas Johnson
immediately resigned from the Supreme Court, exasperated at the failure
of his expectation that the justices' "excessively fatiguing" experience
would mandate "their Discharge from Circuit Duty" when they formally
requested it.
143
Judges to be directed to go here or come there at the Disposition of another Court, or other Judges,
may be a Question of at least Delicacy," letter from Marchant to Foster (Jan. 1, 1793), Foster
Papers, supra note 50, the Senate committee finally did not make any district judges itinerant, choos-
ing to let one circuit justice join with the resident district judge to constitute each circuit court.
140. Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Jan. 9, 1793), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
141. Letter from Fisher Ames to David L. Barnes (Dec. 12, 1792), supra note 139. See also
letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Dec. 11, 1792), Foster Papers, supra note 50. Jay's
strong desire to be rid of circuit duty had caused him to discount Hamilton's accurate mid-Decem-
ber comment that "[the representation [of the Justices] will probably produce some effect though
not as great as ought to be expected." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Dec. 18, 1792),
reprinted in 17 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 95, at 338. Jay had heard "that some members of
Congress doubt the Expediency of adopting our Plan," and urged Cushing to talk them out of their
doubts. Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Jan. 9, 1793), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
142. Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Dec. 6, 1792), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF AMES,
supra note 85, at 956.
143. Letter from Thomas Johnson to George Washington (Jan. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1
SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 14, at 88. Johnson underwent the "fatigu-
ifig" experience only once-having inveigled his way out of the Southern Circuit in the fall of 1791,
and having absented himself from that duty the next spring because of illness. But once was appar-
ently enough for Johnson. He decided that the experience demonstrated the truth of his expecta-
tions. He had bluntly written to Iredell: "[lit is far from certain that I shall be much concerned in
the adjustment of Circuits for if I see I cannot perform the Duties of the Office I shall not long fill
it." Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Iredell (Mar. 31, 1792), C. E. Johnson Papers, supra note
51.
The Southern Circuit was so distasteful that William Paterson, appointed by the President to
succeed Johnson, was immediately assigned to the Southern Circuit for the spring of 1793. All other
Justices appointed to the Court thereafter during the 1790s received a similar baptism, including
Chief Justice Ellsworth. The justices fell all over themselves thanking Paterson for undertaking the
Southern Circuit. Iredell offered him "all the assistance in my power to make it agreable to you, as I
am well acquainted with all that country, having been on the Circuit four times." Letter from James
Iredell to William Paterson (Mar. 6, 1793), C.E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51. Cushing went so far
as to tell Paterson that there "seems to be a favorable prospect of a radical alteration of the present
Itinerant System for the better, probably next session of Congress, which may take off the fatigues of
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Congress did have some relief in mind, however. Instead of termi-
nating circuit riding, it chose to intrude somewhat upon the intricacy of
the Judiciary Act's scheme by reducing from two to one the number of
justices required in a circuit court."4 Each member of the Supreme
Court would thus have to ride only one circuit every year. The judges
later thanked Congress for the Judiciary Act of 1793,141 which "afforded
travelling & the inconvenience of so much absence from home." Letter from William Cushing to
William Paterson (Mar. 5, 1793), Paine Papers, supra note 25.
144. See letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Dec. 11, 1792), Foster Papers, supra
note 50.
145. An Act in Addition to the Act, entitled "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States," ch. 57, § 1, 1 Stat. 333 (1793) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1793].
The draft of the Act is entirely in the handwriting of Senator Ellsworth, as we have seen, the
principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and later Chief Justice. Throughout his tenure in the
Senate, Ellsworth was one of the most respected figures with regard to proposed judicial legislation.
Ellsworth and Congress, in the winter of 1792-93, attempted to make the expected comprehensive
revision of the judicial establishment, but, in addition to Ellsworth's opposition to major change in
his carefully drawn 1789 Act, they felt themselves limited to matters that would not excite federal-
ism concerns.
As a result, other additions and corrections to the 1789 Act were written into the Judiciary Act of
1793, but they were only minor changes. These included the first appearance of language that has
since been made into a separate statute and has come to be known as the Anti-Injunction Act ("nor
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state"). In the 1793 Act
this was only a clause buried in the middle of a long, technical, and unimportant section dealing with
injunctions and writs ne exeat. Judiciary Act of 1793, supra § 5.
Today's importance of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1984), belies the obscurity of
its origins. It has no legislative history. It is likely, however, that Ellsworth, casting about for all
acceptable improvements to his 1789 Act, extracted the essence of similar provisions in the 1790
report of Attorney General Randolph, which recommended that "no injunction in equity shall be
granted by a district [or circuit] court to a judgment at law of a State court." 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 26, 29.
Randolph, however, would have prevented only federal injunctions of state court judgments. The
central feature of Randolph's 1790 report was the termination of Supreme Court review of state
court decisions and the achievement of as complete a separation of federal court jurisdiction from
state court activity as could be obtained. It is clear from his note, id. at 34 n.8, that his "anti-
injunction" provision was a part of this feature and would not have been independently advocated.
Ellsworth's version is broader, prohibiting federal injunction of any state court proceedings, but it
was designed to limit the injunctive activities of each single justice of the Supreme Court, not injunc-
tions issued by all federal courts. This has been demonstrated by Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under
the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 333-37 (1978). Neither Randolph's nor Ells-
worth's version prohibited federal interference with state adjudication by way of any other of the
intrusive common-law writs, such as prohibition, mandamus, or certiorari. Ellsworth was notori-
ously opposed to equity jurisdiction, whence injunctions issued, see W. BROWN, LIFE OF OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 194 (1905), and during the debate on the Judiciary Act of 1789, he had joined oppo-
nents of the bill to argue that there needed to be "some boundary line between the courts of chancery
and common law." W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES, IN 1789-90-91, at 102 (1880).
The other intrusive writs noted above issued from the common-law jurisdiction of a court, not
from its equity powers. It is thus likely that the portion of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793 that
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them great relief, and enabled them to pass more time at home and in
studies made necessary by their offioial duties."' 146
But, as the Justices cautiously noted in February 1794, this form of
relief also presented new dangers.147 If the Supreme Court justice was
absent from a circuit-through accident, unsupplied vacancy, illness, ad-
verse weather, or any of the other plagues that often prevented such at-
tendance during the eighteenth century--cases could not be decided,
since the 1793 Act required at least one circuit justice for any substantive
decision. 148 Thus, the session, or at least part of it, would have been in
later became the Anti-Injunction Act, as written by Ellsworth, a strong Federalist, was intended
narrowly, to keep equity separate from common-law jurisdiction only where the activities of a single
justice were concerned. Such an approach was consistent with Ellsworth's overall views, which did
not support a broad concession that state courts were the constitutional equivalent of federal courts,
deserving of protection from interference by federal courts. Section 5 of the 1793 act was not "a
significant illustration of the strong apprehension felt by early Congresses at the danger of encroach-
ment by federal courts on state jurisdiction," since this apprehension was felt by only a minority in
Congress at the time, Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347
(1930). Moreover, my research has failed to disclose a single instance of a request by a federal
litigant for an injunction against any aspect of a state court proceeding during the 1790s. The rele-
vant language in section 5 appears in Ellsworth's first draft of the act and continues unchanged to
enactment. See Mayton, supra, at 331-38; Note, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A
Re-Examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 612 (1971).
Other provisions of the early judiciary acts that are now important arose amidst complete silence
in the primary sources. See, eg., Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 1, § 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1988)); see generally Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1985); Randall, Further Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 473 (1986).
146. Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, and William Paterson
to the Congress of the United States (Feb. 14, 1794), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 14, at 77-78. Jay was reported as saying that the 1793 Act gave him
sufficient relief that "he would rather continue in his present office than be Governor of the State."
Letter from Egbert Benson to Rufus King (Dec. 18, 1793), reprinted in I KING PAPERS, supra note
31, at 507. Jay nevertheless allowed his name to be placed in candidacy for the New York governor-
ship at the succeeding election, and it is likely, given his juncture in the 1794 petition of the justices,
that his expression of relief was given so as not to render Congress offended rather than representing
his actual opinion.
147. Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, and William Paterson
to the Congress of the United States (Feb. 14, 1794), supra note 146.
148. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had required two judges for a quorum. Judiciary Act of 1789,
supra note 1, § 4. The district judge in Rhode Island, Henry Marchant, upon learning of the pro-
posed reduction of judges per circuit court to two, had written to his senator noting that a circuit
court might not be able to convene if the district judge should be unable to appear because of calam-
ity, and that a case might not be heard if he had a personal or professional interest in it. Marchant
also noted the expense and delay caused by a disagreement over the law between two judges. Letter
from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Jan. 1, 1793), Foster Papers, supra note 50.
Congress responded to these concerns in part. A single justice was allowed to render substantive
decisions on circuit in the absence or recusal of the district judge. The same power, however, was not
given to a district judge sitting alone on circuit. Judiciary Act of 1793, supra note 144, § 1. Also, a
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vain. The justices once again, in effect, meekly requested abolition of
their circuit duties, adding an argument that opposed the new rotation
requirement:14 9 the possibility that contradictory decisions on a given
point of law might be rendered by successive circuit judges that could not
be appealed because of the $2,000 minimum amount in controversy re-
quired to take a case to the Supreme Court. 150
By now, however, the justices were whistling in the wind. Their let-
ter to Congress was dated precisely one year after their momentous deci-
sion in Chisholm v. Georgia on February 18, 1793, holding that the
Constitution meant what it said when it granted jurisdiction to federal
courts over a suit against the State of Georgia by an individual citizen of
another state, despite the defense of sovereign immunity. 1 States could
be dragged into federal courts by ordinary citizens! Chisholm had ignited
a vociferous resurgence of anti-federal concerns about the dangerous
power of the federal courts, an event that the Federalists had feared and
had tried to head off for six years. Indeed, such concerns had been spo-
radically voiced on the floor of Congress all along, especially when judici-
ary changes were contemplated. Combined with the way in which
circuit-riding interlocked with other provisions of the Judiciary Act,
fears of federal aggrandizement stamped out any chance that the justices
would obtain the sort of judiciary revision the Federalists desired. Con-
gress once again did nothing "radical" in 1794, and in fact was forced by
Anti-Federalist strength to move in precisely the opposite direction when
it proposed to the states the limitation on federal jurisdiction embodied
in the eleventh amendment.152 An embittered Chief Justice Jay predicted
as much to a staunch Federalist friend: "The federal Courts have Ene-
continuance to the next circuit court was required when the two circuit judges divided "upon a final
hearing of a cause, or of a plea to the jurisdiction of the court"; if the division was maintained "when
a different judge of the supreme court shall be present ... the district judge adhering to his former
opinion," judgment was to be rendered "in conformity to the opinion of the presiding judge." Id.,
§ 2.
149. This argument was probably able to be raised solely because Iredell was absent from the
February 1794 session of the Supreme Court. He had been present in August of 1793, when the
justices made no presentation to Congress. 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 14, at 217, 219 n.147.
150. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 1, § 22.
151. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalU.) 419 (1793). For the precise date upon which the
opinions in the case were delivered, see 1 SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
14, at 214-15. Article III, section 2 of the Constitution explicitly granted jurisdiction to federal
courts over "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2.
152. See Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1920-41 (1983).
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mies in all who fear their Influence on State objects. [I]t is to be wished
that their Defects should be corrected quietly. If these Defects were all
exposed to public view in striking Colors, more Enemies wd. arise, and
the difficulty of mending them encreased."153
Circuit-riding could not be terminated during the period from 1789
to 1794-nor could any far-reaching reform of the federal judicial system
be enacted-largely because the concomitant expansion of the federal ju-
diciary, which any such change entailed, struck fear into the hearts of
those wary of increasing the strength or cost of the national government.
Since the new government had been established on a shaky basis, with
doubtful support from many and opposition from many more, including
the constant danger from powerful foreign countries such as Great Brit-
ain, Spain, and France, such fears had to be honored, by adhering to the
compromises that underlay the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Senator Richard Henry Lee, who, as the "Federal Farmer" had cas-
tigated the centralizing potential built into the Constitution's judiciary
scheme, 154 wrote to his friend Patrick Henry in September 1789 that as,
an influential member of the judiciary committee, he had "endeavoured
successfully in the Judiciary bill to remedy, so far [as] a law can remedy,
the defects of the Constitution in that line."' 55 Those who opposed the
Federalists put limits on the federal judiciary when they could muster the
strength, but otherwise continued to accept the Judiciary Act of 1789,
since the compromises contained therein left the federal judiciary with
much less power and scope than it might otherwise have had. They also
lacked sufficient congressional strength to weaken federal judicial power
153. Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 KING PAPERS, supra
note 31, at 509. Jay gave to King a previously unstated reason for terminating circuit riding. Jay now
felt that "the important Questions expected to arise in the Circuit Courts have now been decided in
them." Id. He must have felt that most British creditors had been assured that their debts would be
collected, and that state laws standing in the way of such results would be discredited-another
indication of the instrumental, practical, and concrete reasons that the Founding Fathers had for
establishment of the federal court system. In fact, British creditors felt very little of such assurance.
See Hobson, supra note 88, at 195-98.
A note of resignation now entered Iredell's attempts to soften the Southern Circuit burden. He
requested only a substitute circuit justice for North Carolina's court in the spring of 1794 in order
that suits involving himself as a litigant not be postponed once again. He did not request reassign-
ment to another circuit. It is clear, however, that Iredell, in the winter of 1794, still expected some
sort of "alteration" from "some Gentlemen who are preparing Amendments to the Court System."
Letter from James Iredell to John Jay (Jan. 21, 1794), Jay Papers, supra note 43; see also letter from
James Iredell to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 13, 1794), C.E. Johnson Papers, supra note 51.
154. See supra note 5.
155. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789) (Patrick Henry Papers,
Library of Congress).
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further. Federalists also continued to accept the Judiciary Act, since they
were unable to terminate circuit riding-to say nothing of enacting the
more far-reaching alterations desired by some-without simultaneously
invading values of governmental and personal economy held by their
own constituents. In addition, termination of circuit riding would have
the undesirable effect of arousing and increasing Anti-Federalist senti-
ment in the countryside at a time when the new government could not
withstand much opposition-even though the failure to make the change
meant extreme fatigue and discomfort for the Supreme Court justices.
An exhausted James Iredell was to die in the summer of 1799, only 49
years of age.
